Cell Phone Searches by Employers by McAllister, Marc Chase
Nebraska Law Review 
Volume 99 Issue 4 Article 5 
2021 
Cell Phone Searches by Employers 
Marc Chase McAllister 
Coastal Carolina University, mcallistermarc22@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr 
Recommended Citation 
Marc Chase McAllister, Cell Phone Searches by Employers, 99 Neb. L. Rev. 937 (2020) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol99/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Marc Chase McAllister*
Cell Phone Searches by Employers
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938
II. Privacy Protections for Employer-Initiated Searches and
Seizures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942
A. Employees of Public Employers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942
1. Step One: Determining Whether a “Search” or
“Seizure” Has Occurred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943
a. Fourth Amendment Seizures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943
b. Fourth Amendment Searches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
2. Step Two: Determining Whether the Search or
Seizure Is “Reasonable” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
3. Step Three: Determining the Appropriate
Remedy for a Fourth Amendment Violation . . . . 951
B. Employees of Private Employers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
III. Cell Phone Searches by Public Employers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953
A. Employer-Issued Cell Phones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953
B. Personal Cell Phones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956
1. Search of Personal Cell Phone by Public
Employer Struck Down as Illegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959
2. Search of Personal Cell Phone by Public
Employer Upheld as Lawful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962
IV. Cell Phone Searches by Private Employers . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
A. Employer-Issued Cell Phones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
B. Personal Cell Phones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
V. Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
A. Overall Framework of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
B. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
1. Employer-Issued Cell Phones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978
2. Personal Cell Phones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Marc McAllister is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at Coastal Carolina
University. The author’s research focuses on employment law, including employ-
ment discrimination and employee privacy rights. His recent articles have ap-
peared in the Boston College Law Review, Florida Law Review, Washington and
Lee Law Review, and Alabama Law Review.
937
938 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:937
C. Overall Lawfulness of Cell Phone Searches and
Seizures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
1. Public Employer Searches and Seizures . . . . . . . . 981
a. Employer-Issued Cell Phones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
b. Personal Cell Phones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982
2. Private Employer Searches and Seizures . . . . . . . 984
VI. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article presents a framework for analyzing cell phone
searches by employers. The framework proposed in this Article is
structured around two primary variables: (1) whether the employee
whose cell phone is searched works for a public or private employer,
and (2) whether the cell phone is owned by the employer or employee.
The starting point for developing a framework for cell phone
searches is the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” by state actors,
including public employers.1 To be reasonable, a Fourth Amendment
search or seizure must ordinarily be justified by a warrant or warrant
exception.2 One warrant exception of particular relevance here is the
“workplace exception” established by the United States Supreme
Court in O’Connor v. Ortega, which allows for certain employer-initi-
ated searches on the basis of an employer’s own determination of rea-
sonable suspicion.3 Other key Supreme Court precedents that impact
employee cell phone searches include City of Ontario v. Quon, which
applied the O’Connor exception to uphold an employer’s review of text
messages on an employer-owned device;4 and Riley v. California,
which established heightened privacy protections for personally-
owned cell phones.5
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987)
(establishing that employees of public employers enjoy Fourth Amendment pro-
tections in the workplace).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” (footnote omitted)); accord Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382
(2014).
3. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26; see also infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text
(discussing the reasonable suspicion standard announced in O’Connor).
4. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 750, 756–57 (2010); see infra notes 97–111
and accompanying text (discussing Quon).
5. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–97; see infra notes 113–30 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Riley).
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Regarding device ownership, in Quon an employer’s warrantless
search of an employer-owned device was upheld as lawful, whereas in
Riley a warrantless search of a personally-owned device was deemed
unlawful.6 As in Quon and Riley, this distinction in ownership may
impact the lawfulness of a cell phone search by an employer.7 As such,
this Article develops a framework of analysis that depends, in part, on
this ownership-based distinction.
For searches of personally-owned cell phones by public employers,
this Article argues that such devices are generally beyond the reach of
the O’Connor workplace exception; therefore, they should ordinarily
not be searched by a public employer without a warrant due to their
unique capacity to hold immense amounts of private information.8 De-
spite this general rule, warrantless searches of personally-owned cell
phones by public employers might be lawful if an employer has imple-
mented a clear and narrowly-defined policy authorizing such searches.
This proposed exception would apply, however, only if employees have
voluntarily consented to the employer’s policy and the policy is justi-
fied by a legitimate business need to manage or review particular em-
ployment-related data contained within the phone.
For employer-owned devices involving public employers, this Arti-
cle recognizes that employees generally have limited expectations of
privacy in such devices vis-à-vis their employers, particularly where
an employer’s policy permits their inspection, making such devices
more freely searchable by employers. Nevertheless, in cases where an
employee could reasonably expect privacy in an employer-issued cell
phone, this Article argues, consistent with O’Connor and Quon, that
such searches must be both reasonable at the inception and reasona-
ble in scope.9 Of particular relevance under the O’Connor framework,
this Article emphasizes the need for employers to properly limit the
scope of their search to avoid accessing private information unteth-
ered from the specific work-related purpose for the search.10
6. Riley, 573 U.S. at 378–81, 401; Quon, 560 U.S. at 750, 764.
7. See infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
8. As articulated by Riley, the contents of modern cell phones generate privacy con-
cerns that exceed even those found in the home, the area that has enjoyed the
most Fourth Amendment protection, thereby precluding their warrantless in-
spection in most instances. Riley, 573 U.S. at 396–97, 401 (declaring that “a cell
phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most
exhaustive search of a house” because a phone contains “many sensitive records
previously found in the home” as well as “a broad array of private information
never found in a home in any form”); id. at 401 (“Our holding, of course, is not
that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a
warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is
seized incident to arrest.”).
9. See Quon, 560 U.S. at 764; O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987).
10. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (explaining that two types of employer-initiated
searches might fall within the scope of the O’Connor exception: (1) those made for
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Turning to searches by private employers, this Article argues that
the requirements for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion (tort of intru-
sion) provide the proper framework for analyzing searches of em-
ployee cell phones. The tort of intrusion is often used to challenge
alleged privacy invasions by private employers11 and typically re-
quires a plaintiff to prove (1) the employer intentionally intruded upon
the employee’s solitude, seclusion, or private affairs, and (2) the em-
ployer’s infringement would severely offend a reasonable person.12
Although facially distinct, the requirements for the tort of intru-
sion overlap with those of the Fourth Amendment, making this Arti-
cle’s proposed framework for private employers similar to that
proposed for public employers. For example, whether as part of the
first or second element of the tort, courts considering intrusion claims
usually consider whether the plaintiff could reasonably expect privacy
in the case at hand.13 Accordingly, as under the Fourth Amendment,
employees who believe their cell phones were unlawfully searched by
a noninvestigatory, work-related purpose, such as entering an office to retrieve a
needed file; and (2) those made as part of an investigation of work-related
misconduct).
11. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (stating that at least
forty-one states and the District of Columbia have recognized the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion, and noting that over thirty states have applied the tort in the
employment context); see also, e.g., Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Victor, 43 F. Supp. 3d
1026, 1033–34 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (stating that California recognizes four categories
of the tort of invasion of privacy, and discussing a tort of intrusion claim based on
an employer’s search of an employee’s cell phone); Kaczmarek v. Cabela’s Retail
Ill., Inc., No. 1–14–3813, 2015 WL 6156352, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 16, 2015)
(involving an employee’s tort of intrusion claim challenging her employer’s search
of her personal cell phone); Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Iowa 2011)
(involving a tort of intrusion claim challenging an employer’s act of installing a
hidden video camera in the employee restroom); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v.
Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. App. 1984) (involving a tort of intrusion claim
challenging an employer’s search of an employee’s locker).
12. See Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373
(D.N.J. 2012) (applying New Jersey law); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441, 677
S.W.2d at 636 (“[I]n Texas, an actionable invasion of privacy by intrusion must
consist of an unjustified intrusion of the plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion of such
magnitude as to cause an ordinary individual to feel severely offended, humili-
ated, or outraged.”).
13. According to some courts, the first element of the tort “requires an intentional
intrusion into a matter the plaintiff has a right to expect privacy,” making it nec-
essary to consider the threshold question of reasonable expectation of privacy.
See Koeppel, 808 N.W.2d at 181; see also Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d at
1033 (stating that under the first element of the tort of intrusion, “the defendant
must intentionally intrude into a place, conversation, or matter as to which the
plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy”). According to other courts, an
infringement upon one’s privacy cannot be highly offensive if there is no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the first place. See Acosta v. Scott Labor LLC, 377 F.
Supp. 2d 647, 649–52 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (analyzing a plaintiff-employee’s intrusion
upon seclusion claim by considering whether the employee could reasonably ex-
pect privacy in videotaping occurring at work and, upon finding he could not,
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their employer cannot prevail on an intrusion claim if they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the first place.14 In addition, the
inquiry regarding whether an employee can reasonably expect privacy
in the contents of a device is identical for both types of employment
situations, and in either context, it “must be addressed on a case-by-
case basis” with a particular emphasis on the most common factors
relevant to cell phone searches.15 Beyond this threshold issue, Fourth
Amendment claims and those based on the tort of intrusion each re-
quire an invasion of an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy to
such a degree as to be declared objectively unlawful.16 Accordingly, for
intrusion claims involving cell phone searches by private employers,
many of the same Fourth Amendment considerations would apply, in-
cluding (1) whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the device and its contents, and (2) whether the search or
seizure is properly limited in scope so as to avoid accessing private
information untethered to the intrusion’s justifications.17
Part II of this Article summarizes the law governing searches and
seizures of employee cell phones by both public and private employers.
Part III more closely examines cell phone searches by public employ-
ers, including a summary of recent cases involving employer-issued
and personally-owned cell phones. Following a similar structure, Part
IV examines recent cases involving cell phone searches by private em-
stating that it need not address whether the alleged privacy intrusion was
“highly offensive”).
14. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715 (involving a public employer search); Sunbelt Rentals,
Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (involving a private employer search); see also RE-
STATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.01 cmt. g (“[C]ourts have utilized Fourth Amend-
ment principles in deciding whether employees generally have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their offices, regardless of whether they work for the
government or for a private company.”).
15. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 660 (N.J. 2010) (quoting
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718); see infra section V.B. (setting forth the most common
factors relevant to cell phone searches).
16. See Rush v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs. LLC, 977 F. Supp. 2d 414, 435 n.25 (D.N.J.
2013) (regarding a tort of intrusion claim, stating that “the Court is constrained
to apply the objective standard to determine if there was a highly offensive
breach of the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy”); Stengart, 990 A.2d
at 660 (“As is true in Fourth Amendment cases, the reasonableness of a claim for
intrusion on seclusion has both a subjective and objective component.”).
17. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.01 cmt. d (recognizing that although there
are differences between the Fourth Amendment’s standard of “reasonableness”
and the intrusion tort’s standard of “offensiveness,” both tests “provide for a bal-
ancing of the nature and degree of privacy interests infringed as compared to the
legitimate interests for the invasion”); cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746,
764 (2010) (“For these same reasons—that the employer had a legitimate reason
for the search, and that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of that
justification—the Court also concludes that the search would be ‘regarded as rea-
sonable and normal in the private-employer context’ . . . .”).
942 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:937
ployers. Part V provides guidelines and proposals for cell phone
searches by employers. Part VI concludes.
II. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR EMPLOYER-INITIATED
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
American workers, whether employed by public or private employ-
ers, are entitled to a host of privacy protections in the workplace.18
Because there is no single privacy law in America, employees may be
protected from privacy invasions by various laws, including federal
and state statutes, tort law, and constitutional requirements.19 This
Part deals specifically with the most common workplace privacy
claims arising out of searches and seizures by employers. Because the
law on this issue differs for public and private employers, this Part
addresses each type of employer separately.
A. Employees of Public Employers
When employees of a public employer believe their privacy rights
were violated, they will usually sue the employer under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging a violation of the constitutional right to be free from
“unreasonable searches and seizures” under the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.20
18. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715 (establishing that employees of public employers
enjoy Fourth Amendment protections in the workplace).
19. Mauricio Paez & Mike La Marca, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal Issues
for Businesses, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 40 (2016). Privacy-related statutes typically
apply to specific industries or particular types of data. See Courtney Albini, Com-
ment, Borrowing from the Old [Common Law] to Litigate the New [Beacon Sur-
veillance Claims], 2018 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 239, 239 (2018); see also Dirkes v.
Borough of Runnemede, 936 F. Supp. 235, 238 (D.N.J. 1996) (listing various fed-
eral privacy statutes); RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.01 (listing a variety of
state and federal statutes that apply to particular types of privacy intrusions).
Examples of federal privacy statutes include the Fair Credit Reporting Act of
1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2020) (“recognizing,” according to the court in
Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at 238, “an individual’s right to privacy with regard to access
and disclosure of credit records”); the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2020) (“recognizing,” according to the court in Dirkes,
936 F. Supp. at 238, “the individual’s right to privacy with regard to access and
disclosure of student records”); and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 26 U.S.C. § 6103
(2020) (“recognizing,” according to the court in Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at 238, “an
individual’s right to privacy with regard to disclosure of tax returns”). Along with
federal statutes, state statutes might also restrain employers. For example, some
state statutes make it unlawful for employers to utilize GPS tracking as a means
of investigating their employees (usually with an exception based on employee
consent). See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21–2.5 (2014) (generally prohibiting
persons in Illinois from using “an electronic tracking device to determine the loca-
tion or movement of a person,” with an exception for consent, among others).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 714 (involving a Fourth
Amendment claim based on an employer’s search of a public employee’s office);
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Although the Fourth Amendment contains over fifty words and
sets forth detailed requirements for obtaining a warrant, at its core, it
prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.”21 Considering these
four words, courts have broken Fourth Amendment analysis into
three steps: (1) examining whether a Fourth Amendment “search” or
“seizure” has occurred; (2) if so, determining whether that action was
“unreasonable”; and (3) if so, deciding whether an appropriate remedy
exists for the particular Fourth Amendment violation. These steps are
outlined more fully below, with an emphasis on how the Fourth
Amendment restrains public employers.
1. Step One: Determining Whether a “Search” or “Seizure” Has
Occurred
In the first step of Fourth Amendment analysis, courts consider
whether a Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure” has occurred. This
is the critical threshold issue in Fourth Amendment analysis because
without a search or seizure, there is no Fourth Amendment action,
without which there can be no Fourth Amendment violation.22
a. Fourth Amendment Seizures
Fourth Amendment claims may involve seizures of persons or
seizures of property. Under Fourth Amendment precedent, a seizure
of property occurs “when there is some meaningful interference with
an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”23 A seizure
would occur, for example, when police exercise control over a person’s
property by taking the property into police possession.24 In the em-
ployment context, a seizure might occur when an employer downloads
the contents of an employee’s private cell phone onto the employer’s
work computer (to facilitate a subsequent search of those contents).25
see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law.”).
21. U.S. CONST. amend IV; see Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014) (“As
the text [of the Fourth Amendment] makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.”’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006))); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977)
(“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion
of a citizen’s personal security.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))).
22. See 19 MO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4:1 (3d ed., 2019) (“If no
‘search’ or ‘seizure’ takes place, then the Fourth Amendment inquiry may be ter-
minated because when there is no search or seizure, there is no need to obtain a
warrant or even to consider whether the search or seizure was ‘reasonable.’”).
23. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
24. See id. at 120 n.18.
25. See Larios v. Lunardi, 445 F. Supp. 3d 778 (E.D. Cal. 2020).
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Seizures of persons are less common in employment, but some-
times occur. As a general principle, a person is seized under the
Fourth Amendment when there has been “a meaningful interference
with his freedom of movement.”26 As noted, however, Fourth Amend-
ment claims based on a seizure of an individual usually do not arise
when the contents of an employee’s cell phone are examined, which
instead gives rise to Fourth Amendment search claims.27
b. Fourth Amendment Searches
Under Fourth Amendment law, the term “search” is a legal term of
art distinct from its ordinary dictionary definition.28 Indeed, many
routine police activities that are specifically designed to uncover crimi-
nal evidence are not considered Fourth Amendment searches, such as
a dog sniff for drugs at an airport.29
To determine whether a Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred,
courts typically apply the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test de-
rived from Katz v. United States.30 Under the Katz test, a Fourth
Amendment “search” occurs when the government violates a person’s
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable or
legitimate.31
26. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). In the criminal in-
vestigation context, seizures of persons include arrests or de facto arrests, which
require probable cause. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1990) (in-
volving an arrest); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 206–16 (1979) (involving
a de facto arrest). Seizures of persons also include less intrusive investigative
detentions of limited scope and duration, known as “Terry-level” seizures, which
require reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, as opposed to probable cause. See
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–22, 27–28 (authorizing a brief, temporary seizure of a per-
son suspected of committing a crime on the basis of reasonable suspicion). For a
summary of the types of Fourth Amendment seizures, see generally United
States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1467–68 (10th Cir. 1996).
27. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618 (treating the collection and analysis of blood,
urine, and breath samples from employees as Fourth Amendment searches,
rather than seizures of the person, and noting that “any limitation on an em-
ployee’s freedom of movement that is necessary to obtain the[se] . . . samples . . .
must be considered in assessing the intrusiveness of the searches effected by the
Government’s testing program”).
28. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (contrasting the Fourth
Amendment definition of “search” with the dictionary definition of “search”).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
30. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘rea-
sonable.’”); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (discussing the Katz framework); United
States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (speaking in terms of a “legiti-
mate expectation of privacy,” or “one that society is prepared to accept as objec-
tively reasonable”).
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Whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable depends on con-
text and may turn on a host of factors.32 In the employment context,
the most significant factors affecting whether an employee may rea-
sonably expect privacy include (1) who owns the property subject to
intrusion (recognizing that employees typically expect more privacy in
personally-owned devices as opposed to devices owned by their em-
ployers);33 (2) whether an employee has been notified of, and con-
sented to, the employer’s conduct;34 and (3) whether the area or item
searched was widely accessible, or instead accessible only to the indi-
vidual claiming an expectation of privacy.35 Additional factors com-
monly affecting expectations of privacy under Fourth Amendment
32. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715, 718 (1987) (“[T]he reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy . . . is understood to differ according to context.”). Compare
Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding, based on the partic-
ular facts of the case, that the employee “had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of his office computer”), with United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d
1246, 1248–49 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding employee had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents of a personal computer he used at work).
33. See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 398; United States v. Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d
651, 654 (E.D. Va. 2011).
34. See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 398 (recognizing that although “[g]overnment em-
ployees may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their offices . . . . office
practices, procedures, or regulations may reduce legitimate privacy expectations”
(citations omitted)); id. (on the merits, finding that searching an employee’s com-
puter did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because the employer’s policy
allowed it to “ ‘audit, inspect, and/or monitor’ employees’ use of the Internet, in-
cluding all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages”); United
States v. Yudong Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234, 238–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding a
computer search over a Fourth Amendment challenge in part because employee
gave written consent to inspection when he began his employment); Hamilton,
778 F. Supp. 2d at 654 (finding public school employee could not reasonably ex-
pect privacy in e-mails with his wife that were stored on his work computer be-
cause he was on notice and acknowledged that “contents of his computer were
subject to inspection”); Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 655
(Cal. 1994) (“[T]he presence or absence of opportunities to consent voluntarily to
activities impacting privacy interests obviously affects the expectations of the
participant.”).
35. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718 (“[S]ome government offices may be so open to
fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable.”). Re-
garding this particular factor, an employee could not reasonably expect privacy in
most activities conducted in an open-air cubicle at work, such as a telephone con-
versation occurring within earshot of a fellow employee. See id. On the other
hand, “[i]f [an] employer equips the employee’s office with a safe or file cabinet or
other receptacle in which to keep his private papers, he can assume that the con-
tents of the safe are private.” Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th
Cir. 2002).
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precedent include (4) the location of the search;36 (5) the intrusiveness
of an investigative technique;37 and (6) the manner of investigation.38
Beyond these relatively common factors, any other relevant factor
in the case at hand may impact whether an expectation of privacy is
reasonable.39 In addition, a person’s status might fundamentally alter
his or her expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Pris-
oners, K-12 students, and arrestees, for example, generally have re-
duced expectations of privacy as compared to ordinary adult
citizens.40 Along these lines, employees generally have lesser expecta-
tions of privacy vis-à-vis their employers than they ordinarily have in
other contexts, simply as a result of the employment relationship.41
36. In the criminal investigation context, for example, the Supreme Court has ruled
that dog sniffs do not constitute Fourth Amendment “searches” given that the
asserted expectation of privacy is unreasonable when the dog sniff occurs in the
airport, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (involving a dog sniff of a
passenger’s luggage), or on a public road where the dog is employed to sniff
around a car, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has ruled that use of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a
home was a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Florida v. Jardines, 569
U.S. 1 (2013).
37. Generally speaking, the closer one gets to a person’s body, the more invasive the
search or seizure becomes. A strip search, for example, requires a greater degree
of suspicion than a search of a person’s backpack or outer clothing. See Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 373–77 (2009) (upholding war-
rantless search of a teenage girl’s backpack and outer clothing, but striking down
a search of her underwear and bra as a “quantum leap from outer clothes and
backpacks”).
38. This factor is often significant when sophisticated technology is used in an inves-
tigation. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the government might
obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance
techniques.”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–36 (2001) (striking down
warrantless police use of a thermal imaging device to scan the outside of a sus-
pect’s home, and recognizing that searches conducted via sophisticated technolo-
gies are fundamentally distinct from those that are not).
39. See State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (listing factors
courts use in deciding whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the place or object searched); State v. Tentoni, 871 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2015) (listing similar factors).
40. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013) (“Once an individual has been ar-
rested on probable cause for a dangerous offense that may require detention
before trial, however, his or her expectations of privacy and freedom from police
scrutiny are reduced.”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–57
(1995) (recognizing that K-12 students have a reduced expectation of privacy);
State v. Kisack, 17-0797 (La. 10/18/17); 236 So. 3d 1201, 1204 (recognizing that
“prisoners have a reduced expectation of privacy” under Fourth Amendment law);
see also Bernard James, T.L.O. and Cell Phones: Student Privacy and Smart De-
vices After Riley v. California, 101 IOWA L. REV. 343, 350 (2015) (discussing K-12
cases).
41. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723–25 (1987); RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW
§ 7.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“[E]mployees have different expectations of
privacy than they may have outside of the workplace.”).
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As an alternative to the Katz test, courts sometimes apply the
physical trespass test to determine whether a Fourth Amendment
“search” has occurred.42 Here, courts consider whether the govern-
ment obtained information by physically intruding on a person, house,
paper, or effect,43 in which case a Fourth Amendment “search” has
occurred (whether or not it would be reasonable to expect privacy in
the case).44 Such a trespass occurs when a government agent, without
consent, encroaches an area or object protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment, such as a vehicle or a home.45 This alternative test, while im-
portant, has not been applied to employer-initiated investigations as
often as the reasonable expectation of privacy test.46
2. Step Two: Determining Whether the Search or Seizure Is
“Reasonable”
If a court determines that a Fourth Amendment search or seizure
has occurred, the court then examines whether the search or seizure
was “reasonable.”47 Exactly what makes a search or seizure reasona-
ble varies by context. In the criminal investigation context, warrants
and probable cause are often required for a search or seizure to be
42. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“There are two ways in which the government’s conduct may constitute a ‘search’
implicating the Fourth Amendment.”); see Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07, 409.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (establishing, in pertinent part, “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures”).
44. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013).
45. Id. at 11 (“That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intrud-
ing on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a search
occurred.”); id. at 7–10 (discussing the lack of consent on the part of Jardines);
Jones, 565 U.S. at 410.
46. See generally Matthew Tokson, The Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 MINN. L.
REV. 741, 741 (2019) (recognizing that searches are “[c]urrently . . . largely de-
fined by the Katz test”). Under Fourth Amendment precedent, the physical tres-
pass test had been mostly dormant after Katz and only recently returned to
prominence as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones. Thus, it should
come as no surprise that in O’Connor, decided long before Jones, the Supreme
Court treated the reasonable expectation of privacy test as controlling in the em-
ployment context. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715 (stating that a government em-
ployee’s Fourth Amendment rights are “implicated only if the [government
employer] . . . infringed ‘an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to con-
sider reasonable’” (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984))).
47. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1967) (determining that
after finding that a “search” had occurred, “[t]he question remaining for decision,
then, is whether the search and seizure conducted in this case complied with con-
stitutional standards”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979)
(declaring that “no warrant was required” after finding that no “search”
occurred).
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reasonable.48 Neither warrants nor probable cause are required, how-
ever, when a search or seizure is conducted for a non-law enforcement
or “special needs” purpose, as is the case with searches conducted by
public school officials,49 building inspectors,50 and public employers.51
Because such government actors are not usually engaged in criminal
investigations, where warrants and probable cause take center stage,
their actions must instead be “reasonable under all the circum-
stances,” a standard that itself varies by context.52
In the employment context, the overall question of whether a
search or seizure is “reasonable under all the circumstances” contains
two separate inquiries: (1) whether the search was reasonable at its
inception, and (2) whether the search was reasonable in scope.53 Ac-
cording to the United States Supreme Court case that established this
test, O’Connor v. Ortega,54 a search by an employer will be reasonable
at its inception when the employer has “reasonable grounds for sus-
pecting” either (a) “that the search will turn up evidence that the em-
ployee is guilty of work-related misconduct” (like a suspected company
theft); or (b) “that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory,
work-related purpose” (like entering an office to “retrieve a needed
file”).55 Of particular relevance is the requirement that the search be
“work-related” or based on some legitimate employer interest, which is
48. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“ ‘Over and again this Court has emphasized that’ . . .
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963)) (cit-
ing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951))). Although warrants require
a showing of probable cause, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, many warrant exceptions
also require probable cause. The automobile exception to the warrant require-
ment, for example, may allow police to search a vehicle without a warrant if they
have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. See Penn-
sylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). Also, under the search incident to
arrest exception, police must have probable cause to arrest a suspect before they
may search the arrestee incident to the arrest. See United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 235 (1973). The plain view exception to the warrant requirement like-
wise requires a showing of probable cause. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,
326 (1987) (stating “[w]e now hold that probable cause is required” to seize an
item under the plain view exception). But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(explaining that a “stop and frisk” is not subject to the requirements of a warrant
and probable cause).
49. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985).
50. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
51. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 719–22.
52. See id. at 725–26; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
53. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 726.
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built into these standards.56 In addition, as used here, the term “rea-
sonable grounds for suspecting” is synonymous with the Fourth
Amendment’s “reasonable suspicion” standard,57 one that is less de-
manding than probable cause.58
According to O’Connor, a search will be reasonable in scope when
“the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search and not excessively intrusive in light of . . . the nature of the
[misconduct].”59 Under this standard, the very suspicion that justifies
the search delineates its permissible scope.60 For example, if an em-
ployer has sufficient reason to believe an employee has a red-colored
file in her office that contains evidence of employee misconduct, such
as stolen trade secrets, the employer would be justified in entering
that office and searching through any file cabinet or container large
56. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010); see also infra notes 97–130
and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Quon and Riley while explaining
the crux of the decisions).
57. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724 (“The delay in correcting the employee misconduct
caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be
translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and
ultimately to the public interest.” (emphasis added)). Although, at times, the
O’Connor Court used the phrase “reasonable grounds for suspecting,” similar
phrasing has been used by the Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment cases as a
substitute for the “reasonable suspicion” standard. See United States v. Vinton,
594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that, in the context of the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, the Court’s use of the
phrase “reasonable to believe” in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), “probably
is akin to the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard”). Moreover, the O’Connor language
itself has been interpreted by courts as requiring a showing of “reasonable suspi-
cion.” See In re Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 472–73
(N.Y. 2013) (“Under O’Connor, a workplace search based on a reasonable suspi-
cion of employee misconduct is ‘justified at its inception.’” (quoting O’Connor, 480
U.S. at 726)).
58. Comparing these two standards, the Supreme Court summarized “the required
knowledge component of probable cause” as “rais[ing] a ‘fair probability’ or a ‘sub-
stantial chance’ of discovering evidence of criminal activity” and described “[t]he
lesser standard” of reasonable suspicion as “a moderate chance of finding evi-
dence of wrongdoing.” Safford United Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364,
371 (2009) (citations omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244
n.13 (1983)).
59. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (alterations in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
60. See, e.g., Quon, 560 U.S. at 761 (finding an employer’s review of text message
transcripts reasonable because it was an efficient and expedient way to deter-
mine whether overages were the result of work-related messaging or personal
use); see also Zimmerman v. Knight, 421 F. Supp. 3d 514, 522–23 (S.D. Ohio
2019) (discussing whether an employer’s “download of 2,731 pages of text
messages, photographs, web browser history, and call history from [p]laintiff’s
cell phone” was reasonable in scope by examining whether the downloaded mate-
rial was relevant to the employee misconduct inquiry).
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enough to hold that particular file.61 Importantly, however, the right
to search for the file extends only to those areas where it could reason-
ably be concealed.62 Accordingly, in this example, it would not be rea-
sonable to search inside a tiny pill bottle, nor would it be reasonable to
search through a box of manila-colored files. Finally, once the red-
colored file is found, the search should end so as to be no more intru-
sive than necessary.63
Beyond these basic reasonableness requirements, O’Connor em-
phasized that judicial oversight of public employer searches would not
be particularly rigorous and that “public employers must be given
wide latitude” to perform such intrusions.64 The Court suggested,
however, that the “workplace” exception to the warrant requirement
would not apply beyond “the boundaries of the workplace context,”
which the Court delineated as “those areas and items that are related
to work and are generally within the employer’s control.”65 “At a hos-
pital, for example, [the workplace includes] hallways, cafeteria, of-
fices, desks, and file cabinets . . . [which] remain part of the workplace
context even if the employee has placed personal items in them.”66
Still, the Court cautioned that “[n]ot everything that passes through
61. Cf. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION 217–18 (Thomson West 2004) (stating that “when
the object the police indicated they are looking for could be concealed therein,
they may even search unlocked containers found in that place,” while discussing
the scope of consent principles).
62. See 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 256–57 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing scope of search principles under the
Fourth Amendment and recognizing that “it would be improper for the [searching
party] to open a container too small to hide the object of the search”).
63. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (recognizing
under the tort of intrusion that the scope of an intrusion is relevant to determin-
ing whether it is wrongful, and that “[i]f the scope extends beyond the purpose of
the intrusion in furthering the employer’s legitimate business interest, the intru-
sion is unjustified”). Scope of search problems are common in the Fourth Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 388–95 (1978) (upholding, in the
criminal investigation context, an immediate warrantless search of a home for
potential homicide victims by officers inside the home when a shooting occurred,
but striking down a subsequent warrantless search of the entire premises by dif-
ferent officers occurring long after the emergency had ended); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (upholding police officers’ warrantless entry of a
home in hot pursuit of a fleeing armed robber and permitting a search of the
home “for persons and weapons” in light of this particular exigency); In re Cun-
ningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 470–74 (N.Y. 2013) (find-
ing an employer’s 30-day surreptitious GPS tracking of its employee’s private
vehicle unlawful because unreasonable in scope).
64. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723–25. This is because, according to the Court, the
employer’s interest in efficient operation of the workplace is “substantial,”
whereas employees have limited expectations of privacy at work that “are far less
than those found at home or in some other contexts.” Id. at 724–25.
65. Id. at 715.
66. Id. at 715–16.
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the confines of the business address can be considered part of the
workplace context.”67 The Court noted, for example, that its “standard
for a workplace search does not necessarily apply to a piece of closed
personal luggage . . . that happens to be within the employer’s busi-
ness address,” such as when an employee “bring[s] closed luggage to
the office prior to leaving on a trip”68 (presumably because such an
item would not be one that is “related to work and . . . generally within
the employer’s control”).69
In sum, O’Connor provides five important lessons for searches by
government employers. First, government employees may reasonably
expect privacy in the workplace, depending on the workplace’s unique
circumstances.70 Second, Fourth Amendment claims of public employ-
ees will usually depend on whether the employer’s actions were rea-
sonable both at the inception and in scope.71 Third, for a search to be
reasonable at its inception, the employer must have “reasonable suspi-
cion”72 that either the search will turn up evidence of work-related
misconduct, such as a suspected company theft, or that “the search is
necessary for a noninvestigatory[,] work-related purpose[,] such as to
retrieve a needed file” from an employee’s office.73 Fourth, to be rea-
sonable in scope, the employer’s search must not be “excessively intru-
sive” in light of the underlying business justification for the search.74
Finally, not every employer intrusion will fall within the scope of the
warrant requirement’s workplace exception, as some items will not be
within “the boundaries of the workplace context” if they are not suffi-
ciently “related to work and . . . generally within the employer’s
control.”75
3. Step Three: Determining the Appropriate Remedy for a
Fourth Amendment Violation
If the court finds that an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search
or seizure has occurred, the court will then determine the appropriate
remedy for the constitutional violation. In the criminal prosecution
context, the usual remedy is exclusion of evidence obtained as a result
of the Fourth Amendment violation.76 Exclusion of evidence might
67. Id. at 716.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 715.
70. See id. at 715–16.
71. Id. at 725–26.
72. See supra note 57.
73. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 715–16.
76. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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also be appropriate in certain employee disciplinary proceedings.77
But more commonly, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit based on an al-
leged Fourth Amendment violation by an employer, the usual remedy
is money damages for the employee whose Fourth Amendment rights
were violated.78
B. Employees of Private Employers
Given the lack of state action, private employers are typically not
subject to Fourth Amendment constraints.79 For alleged privacy inva-
sions, private employers may instead face liability through tort law,
including the torts of intrusion upon seclusion (intrusion),80 public
disclosure of truthful but private facts about an individual,81 placing a
person in a “false light” by unreasonable and highly objectionable pub-
licity,82 and appropriating the name or likeness of another for one’s
own commercial use or benefit.83 These distinct forms of invasion each
77. See, e.g., In re Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 89 A.D.3d 1347, 1350
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (applying the exclusionary rule in an employee disciplinary
proceeding), rev’d on other grounds, 997 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 2013).
78. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1984)
(noting that a plaintiff-employee was awarded $108,000 in damages for an inva-
sion of privacy by her employer).
79. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (“The
[Fourth] Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons
against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those
acting at their direction.”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,
114–15 (1984) (distinguishing between the actions of private individuals, which
are not subject to the Fourth Amendment, and those of government agents, which
must generally comply with Fourth Amendment requirements). In limited in-
stances, however, the actions of a private employer could trigger constitutional
constraints, particularly where the private party acts as an instrument or agent
of the government. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
80. Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 180–81 (Iowa 2011).
81. Id. This tort involves publication of information that would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person and not of legitimate public interest. In one case, for exam-
ple, a plaintiff-employee sued her former employer under this tort when the for-
mer employer posted an interoffice memo about the plaintiff’s termination on a
bulletin board visible to numerous employees. Payton v. City of Santa Clara, 183
Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
82. See, e.g., Taha v. Bucks Cty., 9 F. Supp. 3d 490, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“To prevail
on a claim of ‘false light,’ a plaintiff ‘must show that a highly offensive false state-
ment was publicized by [defendants] with knowledge or in reckless disregard of
the falsity.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Santillo v. Reedel, 634 A.2d 264, 266
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993))); id. at 493–94 (finding sufficient “false light” claim against
company based on plaintiff’s allegations that company selectively published his
expunged arrest record and mugshot on its website in order to falsely portray him
as a criminal).
83. Under this cause of action, liability arises from the use of the name or likeness of
a public figure absent consent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM.
LAW INST. 1979).
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involve an interference with a person’s general “right to be left
alone.”84
The tort of intrusion is commonly used to sue private employers for
privacy invasions arising out of workplace searches and seizures.85 To
prevail on an intrusion claim, a plaintiff must typically prove “that (1)
her solitude, seclusion, or private affairs were intentionally infringed
upon, and that (2) the infringement would highly offend a reasonable
person.”86 Whether as part of the first or second element, courts con-
sidering intrusion claims usually also consider whether the plaintiff
could reasonably expect privacy in the case at hand.87 Beyond this
threshold requirement, the tort of intrusion requires proof that the
invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy is “a substantial one, of a kind that
would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man.”88
III. CELL PHONE SEARCHES BY PUBLIC EMPLOYERS
Having outlined the most common privacy claims arising out of
searches and seizures by public and private employers, this Part ex-
amines cases involving searches of employee cell phones by public em-
ployers, including those involving employer-issued devices and
personal cell phones, as well as seizures of evidence contained within
those devices.
A. Employer-Issued Cell Phones
In the employment context, one of the most significant factors af-
fecting whether an employee may reasonably expect privacy in a par-
ticular case is whether the employer or the employee owns the
property subject to intrusion.89 In today’s economy, employers some-
times provide employees with employer-owned devices, like computers
or cell phones, to be used for work-related purposes. Employers may or
may not permit employees to use these devices for personal reasons as
84. Koeppel, 808 N.W.2d at 181 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt.
b); see also RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“The
great majority of jurisdictions have made these four privacy torts part of their
common law.”).
85. See supra note 11.
86. Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D.N.J.
2012) (applying New Jersey law); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677
S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. App. 1984) (applying Texas law).
87. See supra note 13.
88. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06 cmt. b (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B cmt. d); see also Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d
650, 660 (N.J. 2010) (recognizing that “[a] high threshold must be cleared to as-
sert a cause of action based on th[e] tort” of intrusion).
89. See supra subsection II.A.1.b.
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well.90 In other cases, an employer may permit an employee to use a
personally-owned device for work-related tasks.91
Device ownership is important under the Fourth Amendment be-
cause, generally speaking, employees enjoy greater expectations of
privacy in their personally-owned devices as compared to employer-
owned devices.92 Nevertheless, the commingling of personal and
work-related information that can occur in either type of device may
complicate an employee’s privacy rights in a device.93 In addition, al-
though ownership is significant, it is merely one factor courts may
consider in determining whether an asserted expectation of privacy is
90. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“[M]any employers expect
or at least tolerate personal use of such [employer-provided] equipment by em-
ployees because it often increases worker efficiency.”); see also, e.g., United States
v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that plaintiff’s employer had
permitted him to use his employer-issued phone for his own personal purposes),
abrogated by United States v. Govan, 641 F. App’x 434 (5th Cir. 2016).
91. When a device is provided by the employer, the device is commonly referred to as
“company-owned, personally enabled,” or COPE. When an employer allows an
employee to use a personally-owned device for work-related tasks, such policies
are commonly referred to as “bring your own device,” or BYOD. See SHIRA A.
SCHEINDLIN, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 51,
138 (2d ed. 2016); Paul G. Lannon & Phillip M. Schreiber, BYOD Policies: What
Employers Need to Know, HR MAG. (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today
/news/hr-magazine/pages/0216-byod-policies.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/4LEK-
X6SY].
92. Compare Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 15-
CV-3526 (KMW) (RLE), 2017 WL 4403310, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (strik-
ing down searches of personal cell phones), with Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Victor,
43 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1034–35 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that a former employee of
a private rental company could not legitimately expect privacy in an iPhone be-
longing to his former employer).
93. See, e.g., Finley, 477 F.3d at 259 (finding employee had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the call records and text messages sent on his cell phone, even
though the phone was issued to him by his uncle’s business, because employer
permitted the employee to use the business phone for personal texts and phone
calls); Larios v. Lunardi, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1309 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (“Much like
[the officer in Quon], [Larios] comingled his work life and personal life on a single
device.”); Sollenberger v. Sollenberger, 173 F. Supp. 3d 608, 624 (S.D. Ohio 2016)
(noting that the cell phone at issue in that case had “been used as a personal cell
phone in the past” and “was also used for work purposes and claimed as a work
expenditure for tax purposes”); Cunningham v. Terrebonne Par. Consol. Gov’t,
No. 09-8046, 2011 WL 651997, at *2, *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 11, 2011) (analyzing an
employer’s search of an employee’s cell phone that is a “personal cell phone,” but
for which the plaintiff received a monthly stipend from his employer to pay to-
ward his cell phone bill for the “business use” of his phone).
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reasonable.94 Thus, determining ownership of a device will not, in and
of itself, resolve the case.95
Given the lack of a bright-line rule regarding device ownership,
when an employee challenges a public employer’s search of an em-
ployer-issued device, courts sometimes refuse to decide whether a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy exists and instead resolve the case
under the reasonableness prong of O’Connor. A recent Supreme Court
case, City of Ontario v. Quon, demonstrates this approach.96
Quon involved a city employer’s review of text messages sent and
received on police officer Jeff Quon’s employer-issued pager.97 The
City issued pagers to SWAT Team members, including Quon, to help
the SWAT Team respond to emergency situations.98 At that time, the
City informed its officers that it had a right to monitor text messages
sent and received using the pagers and would treat those text
messages “as public information . . . eligible for auditing.”99
After Quon and others had reimbursed the City multiple times for
exceeding their monthly allowance of text messages, the City wished
to determine whether the monthly text message character limit
should be increased, requiring the City to determine whether officers
were incurring overage fees for work-related or personal messages.100
To that end, Quon’s supervisors obtained two months of pager tran-
scripts from provider Arch Wireless.101 After redacting all messages
94. See United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007) (in analyzing
an employee computer search, recognizing that “private ownership is an impor-
tant factor telling in favor of Fourth Amendment protection,” but that “[i]t is not
. . . dispositive” because “[i]f it were, the Fourth Amendment would track neither
tort law nor social expectations of privacy, for neither affords individuals an abso-
lute veto over third-party access to an item by virtue of ownership alone” (cita-
tions omitted)); United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270–71 (10th Cir. 1989)
(“Although ownership of the item seized is not determinative, it is an important
consideration in determining the existence and extent of a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment interests.”); State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 408–09 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014) (“Ownership or legal possession of the property searched is not the
‘be-all-end-all’ in deciding whether a person has a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in it.”).
95. Compare United States v. Yudong Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(finding an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a computer only
he used, even though the computer was owned by his employer), with Barrows,
481 F.3d at 1248–49 (finding an employee had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his personal laptop computer that he brought to work). See also K-Mart
Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Tex. App. 1984) (finding a
reasonable expectation of privacy in an employer-provided locker).
96. 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
97. Id. at 752–53. As the Court noted, the City of Ontario is a political subdivision of
the State of California. Id. at 750.
98. Id. at 751.
99. See id. at 751–52.
100. Id. at 752.
101. Id.
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Quon sent while off duty, officials learned that most of Quon’s text
messages sent during work hours were not work-related.102 As a re-
sult, Quon was disciplined for pursuing personal matters while on
duty.103 Quon then sued the City, alleging that it violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by reviewing his text messages.104
Applying the O’Connor framework, the Supreme Court assumed,
without deciding, that Quon reasonably expected privacy in the con-
tents of his text messages105 and went on to address the overall rea-
sonableness of the search.106 Finding the search reasonable in all
respects, the Court first declared that the text message review was
“justified at its inception because there were ‘reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search [was] necessary for a noninvestigatory
work-related purpose.’”107 Namely, to ensure the City was paying for
work-related, rather than personal communications, and to determine
whether the character limit on the City’s pager contract should be in-
creased.108 As for the search’s scope, reviewing the transcripts was
reasonable because it was an efficient way to determine the nature of
Quon’s messages.109 In addition, the Court emphasized the limited
scope of review, noting that although Quon had exceeded his monthly
character limit several times, the City reviewed only two months of
transcripts and redacted all messages Quon sent while off duty.110 For
these reasons, the Court upheld the City’s review of Quon’s
messages.111
B. Personal Cell Phones
Quon involved an employer’s review of text messages on a device
owned by the employer. In more recent years, courts have been con-
fronted with the more difficult issue of employer searches of person-
ally-owned devices, including cell phones.
Anytime the contents of a personal cell phone are searched without
a warrant, courts will closely scrutinize the search.112 This is because,
102. Id. at 752–53.
103. Id. at 753. The Court said that “Quon was allegedly disciplined.” Id.
104. Id. at 754. There were other plaintiffs and defendants in the case. See id. at 753.
For simplicity, this Article limits its discussion to Quon’s suit against the City.
105. Id. at 759–60.
106. Id. at 760–61.




110. Id. at 761–62.
111. Id. at 763–65.
112. See, e.g., Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 15-
CV-3526 (KMW) (RLE), 2017 WL 4403310, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (ana-
lyzing Riley’s effect upon an employer cell phone search).
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as established by the United States Supreme Court in Riley v. Califor-
nia, cell phone users generally expect privacy in the immense amount
of personal data and private information stored on such devices.113
In Riley, the Court considered whether police may search digital
information on a cell phone seized from an arrestee without a war-
rant.114 As Riley noted, warrants are generally required to search for
evidence of criminal wrongdoing.115 Under the “search incident to ar-
rest” warrant exception, however, an individual who has been placed
under custodial arrest may be subject to an immediate, warrantless
search for weapons or destructible evidence potentially within the ar-
restee’s reach.116 Even though cell phones found on arrestees could
easily contain destructible evidence, such as an incriminating photo-
graph, the Riley Court refused to extend this exception to cell phone
searches due to the substantial privacy interests inherent in a cell
phone’s digital contents.117
Most importantly for the instant analysis, Riley made sweeping
pronouncements regarding the modern cell phone’s unique privacy
concerns. Riley recognized that “[c]ell phones . . . place vast quantities
of personal information literally in the hands of individuals.”118 The
Court declared, for example, that modern cell phones are “minicom-
puters” capable of being used as telephones, “cameras, video players,
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televi-
sions, maps, or newspapers.”119 Cell phones also have “immense stor-
age capacity,” typically allowing the user to store “millions of pages of
text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.”120 Also, the Court
noted that a cell phone contains various types of information, such as
prescriptions and bank statements, that may reveal a great deal of
information about an individual’s private life.121 According to the
Court, “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and de-
113. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–97 (2014); see also United States v.
Bercoon, No. 1:15-CR-022-LMM-JFK, 2016 WL 9404865, at *17 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 1,
2016) (discussing Riley and citing cases finding that “[a]n owner of a cell phone
generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic data stored on
the phone” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Qunitana, 594 F.
Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009))).
114. Riley, 573 U.S. at 378.
115. Id. at 382.
116. See id.; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
117. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 385–98 (discussing the privacy concerns inherent in mod-
ern cell phones as compared to the privacy concerns at issue in more traditional
searches of purely physical evidence).
118. Id. at 386.
119. Id. at 393.
120. See id. at 393–95.
121. Id. at 394.
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scriptions,” whereas “the same cannot be said of a photograph or two
of loved ones tucked into a wallet.”122
The Riley Court found it significant that cell phones often contain a
rich history of information, including a person’s Internet search and
browsing history over a lengthy period of time.123 Likewise, cell phone
data could show the phone’s precise location at various moments in
time, enabling police to reconstruct someone’s movements based on
the location of the phone.124 Apps might also reveal a great deal of
information about a person’s private affairs, such as political and re-
ligious affiliations, addictions, and finances.125 Finally, the Court
noted that the prevalence of remote data storage magnifies the pri-
vacy interests at stake, as searching a cell phone may enable police to
access additional files stored in the Cloud.126
Given the breadth of private information contained in most mod-
ern cell phones, Riley concluded that cell phone searches are far more
invasive of privacy than searches of a person and his or her effects.127
In addition, Riley suggested that the privacy protections owed modern
cell phones are even greater than what we enjoy in our homes,128 the
area that has traditionally received the most Fourth Amendment pro-
tection,129 thereby implying that personal cell phones are generally
owed the greatest constitutional protection.130
122. Id.
123. See id. at 394–96.
124. See id. at 396.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 397.
127. Id. at 386.
128. Riley declared that “a cell phone search would typically expose to the government
far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.” Id. at 396 (emphasis omit-
ted). This is because, according to Riley, “[a] phone not only contains in digital
form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a
broad array of private information never found in a home in any form.” Id. at
396–97.
129. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the heightened
Fourth Amendment protections in the home. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
130. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 401–02 (stating that, absent “exigent circumstances” or
similar “case-specific exceptions,” law enforcement officers are not permitted to
search an individual’s cell phone without a warrant). Legal scholars and com-
mentators have argued that Riley should be extended beyond the search incident
to arrest context. See, e.g., Eunice Park, The Elephant in the Room: What Is a
“Nonroutine” Border Search, Anyway? Digital Device Searches Post-Riley, 44 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 277 (2017) (proposing a bright-line rule requiring reasonable
suspicion for border searches of laptops and other digital devices); Alexandra
Crandall, Note, A Call for Probationer Data Privacy: Can States Require Cell
Phone Search Waivers?, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1487, 1488 (2017) (arguing that it is
unconstitutional to require all probationers to submit their cell phones to proba-
tionary searches); Thomas Mann Miller, Comment, Digital Border Searches After
Riley v. California, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1943, 1987–96 (2015) (arguing that, after
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1. Search of Personal Cell Phone by Public Employer Struck
Down as Illegal
As a result of Riley, public employer searches of personal cell
phones have sometimes been deemed unlawful. A recent case from
New York, Port Authority Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Authority of
New York & New Jersey,131 provides an interesting example.
In Port Authority, plaintiffs sued the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey (Port Authority) for allegedly violating their Fourth
Amendment rights by searching numerous employee cell phones.132
The events leading to that search began when the 113th class of the
Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) graduated from police
academy training.133 On that day, graduates became Probationary Po-
lice Officers (PPOs) of the PAPD, making their employment easily ter-
minable.134 The following day, many of these PPOs attended a post-
graduation party and after-party at the Texas Arizona Bar & Grill.135
The Texas Arizona after-party was rowdy. At that party, PPOs re-
portedly engaged in a range of misconduct, including damaging prop-
erty, stealing beer, inappropriately touching other patrons, and
fighting with a bouncer.136 “The bouncer at the Texas Arizona stated
it was the ‘worst night’ he had ‘ever worked.’”137
The next morning, Lieutenant Timothy McGovern, the officer in
charge of the unit responsible for police misconduct investigations (the
Riley, courts should require at least reasonable suspicion for all digital border
searches); Sean O’Grady, Note, All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace:
Border Searches of Electronic Devices in the Digital Age, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
2255 (2019) (arguing that courts should extend Riley to border searches of trav-
elers’ electronic devices). See generally Note, The Border Search Muddle, 132
HARV. L. REV. 2278, 2299 (2019) (discussing Riley’s impact on warrantless border
searches); cf. Tristan M. Ellis, Reading Riley Broadly: A Call for a Clear Rule
Excluding All Warrantless Searches of Mobile Digital Devices Incident to Arrest,
80 BROOK. L. REV. 463, 468 (2015) (arguing that courts should extend Riley to
exclude personal electronic devices altogether from the search-incident-to-arrest
warrant exception).
131. No. 15-CV-3526 (KMW) (RLE), 2017 WL 4403310, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017).
132. Plaintiffs also sued certain individuals involved in the cell phone searches at is-
sue, including Lieutenant Steven Adelhelm, Karen Connelly, Superintendent
Michael Fedorko, Lieutenant Timothy McGovern, Michael Nestor, and Steven
Pasichow. The district court, however, dismissed the claims against these indi-
vidual defendants after finding they were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at
*1.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *2 (stating that because the PPOs were probationary employees, “all of
them could have . . . been fired for any non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory
reason”).
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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PIU unit),138 opened a PIU investigation into those events.139 There-
after, McGovern led a team of investigators in interviews of all PPOs
who were present at the Texas Arizona after-party.140 Before these
interviews began, McGovern warned “the PPOs that ‘they were re-
quired to cooperate in an investigation’” and “could face termination”
if they did not.141
On the first day of the interviews, McGovern learned that PPOs
who attended the Texas Arizona after-party had used a cell phone ap-
plication called GroupMe to communicate about the after-party.142
“GroupMe allows a group of individuals to participate in a private chat
room that the entire group can view.”143 McGovern then directed his
investigators to ask PPOs whether they participated in the GroupMe
chats and, when applicable, instructed investigators to request to view
those messages.144
Investigators ultimately reviewed the contents of thirty-six person-
ally-owned PPO cell phones.145 At the start of each interview, PPOs
were informed they had to “cooperate in this investigation”146 and
were not informed they had the right to refuse the cell phone
search.147 As a result, many of the PPOs understood that they had no
choice but to consent to the cell phone search and believed they would
be fired if they did not consent.148
After the investigation, a group of PPOs sued the Port Authority
and various individuals involved in the search, alleging their phones
had been unreasonably searched and seized under the Fourth Amend-
ment.149 In rejecting the defendants’ summary judgment motion on
the claim, District Court Judge Kimba Wood began by proclaiming:
“In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court held that a warrant is gen-
erally required before law enforcement officers may search a cell
phone.”150 If a “case-specific” exception to the warrant requirement
138. Id.






145. Id. The Port Authority did not own any of the phones, did not pay for them, and
did not pay for the cellular service. Id. at *3.
146. Id. Interview transcripts reveal that during thirty-three of those interviews,
PPOs were given the opportunity to speak with their union representative before
acceding to the search. It is unclear whether three of the PPOs were given the
opportunity to speak with a representative. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. (summarizing testimony of various PPOs on this point).
149. Id.
150. Id. at *4. In support, Judge Wood seemingly referenced the following passage in
Riley: “Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is im-
mune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a
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did not apply, “a reasonable jury could find that these Defendants . . .
violat[ed] the PPOs’ Fourth Amendment rights.”151
Defendants first sought to justify their warrantless cell phone
searches under the “work-related” investigation exception of O’Connor
v. Ortega,152 which, as noted, permits certain warrantless searches by
employers that are reasonable at the outset and reasonable in
scope.153 According to O’Connor, however, this warrant exception ap-
plies solely to searches conducted in the “workplace context,” meaning
searches of “those areas and items that are related to work and are
generally within the employer’s control.”154 In the words of the
O’Connor Court:
An employee may bring closed luggage to the office prior to leaving on a trip,
or a handbag or briefcase each workday. While whatever expectation of pri-
vacy the employee has in the existence and the outward appearance of the
luggage is affected by its presence in the workplace, the employee’s expecta-
tion of privacy in the contents of the luggage is not affected in the same way.
The appropriate standard for a workplace search does not necessarily apply to
a piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase that happens to
be within the employer’s business address.155
Based on this passage, Judge Wood found the search of the PPOs’
cell phones unreasonable. According to Judge Wood:
The fact that Defendants were engaging in a purportedly “work-related” in-
vestigation did not permit them to conduct warrantless searches of items
outside of the “workplace context.” It is undisputed that the cell phones at
issue here were purely personal. They were not the property of or paid for by
the Port Authority. Like the closed “handbag or briefcase” described in
O’Connor, PPOs had a strong expectation of privacy in these personal devices.
Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted in Riley, the privacy interest in a person’s
cell phone is similar to, if not greater than, the privacy interest in one’s home.
For this reason, just as courts have held that searches of . . . an employee’s
home generally qualify as outside of the “workplace context,” so too do
searches of a personal cell phone. The O’Connor exception therefore does not
apply here.156
Simply put, like the closed “handbag or briefcase” described in
O’Connor, the PPOs did not relinquish their legitimate expectation of
privacy in the contents of their personally-owned cell phones.157 More-
search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.” Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014).
151. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 2017 WL 4403310, at *4; see also Riley, 573
U.S. at 401–02 (stating that absent “exigent circumstances” or similar “case-spe-
cific exceptions,” law enforcement officers are not permitted to search an individ-
ual’s cell phone without a warrant).
152. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 2017 WL 4403310, at *4.
153. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987).
154. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 2017 WL 4403310, at *4 (quoting O’Connor,
480 U.S. at 715).
155. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 716 (emphasis omitted).
156. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 2017 WL 4403310, at *5 (citations omitted).
157. See id.
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over, because the personal cell phones searched in this case were con-
stitutionally on par with the employees’ homes, and were not “related
to work [nor] . . . generally within the employer’s control,” the
O’Connor workplace exception did not permit their warrantless
inspection.158
Having found that O’Connor’s workplace exception did not author-
ize the cell phone searches at issue, Judge Wood then rejected the de-
fendants’ second defense based on the PPOs’ purported consent. Judge
Wood noted that, to be valid, “[c]onsent must be a ‘product of . . . free
and unconstrained choice,’ rather than a ‘mere acquiescence in a show
of authority.’”159 In addition, consent must “not be coerced, by explicit
or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.”160 And in the
employment context, “[c]oercion may be found where one is given a
choice between one’s employment and one’s constitutional rights.”161
Applying these principles, Judge Wood concluded that a reasonable
jury could find that the PPOs’ acquiescence was coerced.162
Indeed, evidence showed that the PPOs were told more than once
that if they did not cooperate with the investigation, they could be
fired, causing them to believe they would be punished if they did not
consent.163 In addition, investigators never corrected that under-
standing.164 Thus, a reasonable jury could find that the PPOs did not
voluntarily consent to these searches.165 As such, Judge Wood con-
cluded, “a warrant was required before initiating the searches.”166
2. Search of Personal Cell Phone by Public Employer Upheld as
Lawful
The lawfulness of a search of an employee’s personal cell phone
might change under O’Connor when the cell phone, or at least the par-
ticular contents that were searched, is sufficiently “related to work
and . . . generally within the employer’s control.”167 In 2020, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California up-
held such a search in Larios v. Lunardi, granting summary judgment
in favor of the employer on this basis.168
158. Id. at *4–5 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715).








167. Id. at *4 (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987)).
168. See Larios v. Lunardi, 445 F. Supp. 3d 778 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (analyzing the Fourth
Amendment seizure issue in the case); Larios v. Lunardi, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1299
(E.D. Cal. 2020) (analyzing the Fourth Amendment search issue in the case).
2021] CELL PHONE SEARCHES BY EMPLOYERS 963
The plaintiff in that case, Timothy Larios, worked as a California
Highway Patrol (CHP) officer and served on the Shasta Interagency
Narcotics Task Force (SINTF).169 In this role, Larios communicated
with confidential informants, who provided information concerning
suspected criminal activity. Most significantly, SINTF policy prohib-
ited agents from having relationships with informants that were not
“completely ethical and professional in nature.”170
Larios began communicating with confidential informant, Tawnya
Mellow, during SINTF’s investigation of a suspected marijuana dealer
named Nathan Santana. Mellow provided information that allowed
Larios to obtain a search warrant for Santana’s residence, which led to
the discovery of illegal contraband and felony charges against
Santana.171
SINTF had issued its agents cell phones to use for “SINTF busi-
ness,” including speaking with informants. Larios, however, used his
personal cell phone to communicate with Mellow. Although SINTF
policy allowed agents to use their personal phones for SINTF busi-
ness, agents who produced CHP work product on their personal de-
vices were required to transfer that work to an electronic data storage
device. CHP policy declared, “[w]ork stored on any type of electronic
device is the property of the state and must be relinquished on de-
mand.”172 Larios received and reviewed this policy when he was a
SINTF agent.173
After Santana’s arrest, Larios continued to speak with Mellow but
failed to abide by SINTF’s policy for agent-informant communica-
tion.174 By January 2014, Larios and Mellow were romantically in-
volved.175 Several months later, a domestic incident occurred at
Mellow’s home involving Santana, who had discovered a greeting card
on Mellow’s car from Larios that revealed his romantic feelings for
Mellow.176 After Santana left, the police were called, and Mellow told
169. Larios, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1302.
170. Id.
171. Id.




176. Id. The statements made in the card included:
• “Since our first date (12/6/13), I have not been the same . . . And our
walk across the bridge and kiss on the cheek shortly after your innocent
text ‘Marry me’ has me wanting to ask you the same thing.”;
• “Please know I want to spend forever with you as us !!! [sic]”;
• “I want to make you happier than you’ve ever been before, just like you
were in Tahoe. . . .”; and
• “I love you for who you are Tawnya Rachelle and want nothing more
than to unite as one!!”
Id.
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the responding officers that Santana had threatened to kill her over
the incident.177
After this incident, CHP’s Internal Affairs Section began investi-
gating Larios’s relationship with Mellow. Investigators Scott Lunardi
and Mel Hutsell reviewed Larios’s SINTF phone and the card he sent
Mellow and came to suspect that Larios and Mellow were in a prohib-
ited romantic relationship. Investigators also suspected, given the ab-
sence of texts with Mellow on Larios’s SINTF phone, that Larios had
been using his personal cell phone to contact her.178
Larios was ordered to produce his personal cell phone so investiga-
tors could search the device for work product. Investigators first at-
tempted to extract Larios’s texts with Mellow but were unable to do
so. Investigators then tried to video record the string of messages in
Larios’s and Mellow’s text thread but found this approach too time
intensive. As a result, investigators created a backup of Larios’s entire
phone on a computer and later extracted Larios’s messages with Mel-
low from that backup.179
Larios later sued the CHP Commissioner and officers involved in
the search, including Lunardi and Hutsell. Larios brought two sepa-
rate Fourth Amendment claims, alleging that the defendants (1) con-
ducted an unlawful seizure when they downloaded the contents of his
personal cell phone onto a CHP computer; and (2) engaged in an un-
lawful search when they inspected the contents of his cell phone.180
On the search issue, Larios argued that Riley v. California creates
a blanket rule against warrantless cell phone searches.181 The court
disagreed, finding instead that “Riley is not sufficiently similar to the
case at hand to inform this [c]ourt’s analysis.”182 In the court’s view,
Riley involved a criminal investigation that resulted in the search of
personal information on a personal device. In this case, however, the
defendants acted in their capacity as supervisors and conducted an
employee misconduct investigation, rather than a criminal investiga-
tion.183 And most importantly, as part of that inspection, the defend-
ants reviewed text messages that CHP considered “work product”
under its governing policy. Accordingly, the court determined that the
workplace exception of Quon and O’Connor applied, rather than
Riley.184
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1304.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1302.
181. Id. at 1308.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1309–10.
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Applying O’Connor’s two-part reasonableness test, the court first
found that the defendants’ “inspection of CHP work product” within
Larios’s phone was justified at its inception in light of the evidence
that Larios had “inexplicably left a romantic greeting card at the resi-
dence of a confidential informant and the target of a criminal investi-
gation,” which in turn prompted a domestic violence incident and
resulted in the dismissal of Santana’s charges.185 In searching
Larios’s text messages, CHP simply “sought to understand the scope
of [Larios]’s communication with Mellow and mitigate harm that
might flow from his potential misconduct,” making the search reason-
able at the outset.186
Turning to the scope of search, the court emphasized that the de-
fendants appropriately restricted their search to Larios’s texts with
Mellow, and even further “to a subset of [those] messages . . . from
September 1, 2013 (the month Mellow initially contacted SINTF with
information about Santana) to November 5, 2014 (the day before CHP
directed [Larios] to produce his phone).”187 In this respect, the case
again resembled Quon’s “tailored review of an employee’s text
messages.”188 In sum, the court concluded that the “limited search of
[Larios]’s texts with Mellow was reasonably related to the objectives of
the investigation and not excessively intrusive given the grave abuse
of power suspected.”189
In the end, the critical difference between the Port Authority and
Larios cases is the courts’ opposing decisions regarding whether the
O’Connor workplace exception applied. As noted in Larios, the search
of the personal cell phone in that case was done pursuant to a valid
workplace misconduct investigation as authorized under O’Connor.190
Moreover, under the employer’s policy, CHP work product produced
on personal devices is “the property of the state and must be relin-
quished on demand,”191 making these particular cell phone contents
“related to work and . . . generally within the employer’s control”
under O’Connor.192 Finally, in regards to the employer’s search of the
cell phone’s contents, the investigating officers limited their review to
Larios’s texts with Mellow during the relevant time frame, making the




189. Id. Although the court later found the defendants’ seizure of the phone’s entire
contents separately unreasonable, see Larios v. Lunardi, 445 F. Supp. 3d 778, 785
(E.D. Cal. 2020), the case is nevertheless significant in demonstrating how a
properly limited search of a personal cell phone may fall within the parameters of
the O’Connor exception.
190. Larios, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 783.
191. Larios, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1303.
192. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).
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search both reasonable at its inception (on the basis of reasonable sus-
picion to believe those texts would contain evidence of work-related
misconduct) and reasonable in scope (by adopting “measures [that
were] . . . not excessively intrusive in light of . . . the nature of the
[misconduct]”).193 Accordingly, Larios demonstrates that employer-in-
itiated searches of personal cell phones might be justified if the search
falls within the confines of the O’Connor workplace exception.
IV. CELL PHONE SEARCHES BY PRIVATE EMPLOYERS
Cell phone searches by private employers are seemingly rare.194
When they do occur, however, they may give rise to a claim of intru-
sion upon seclusion.195
A. Employer-Issued Cell Phones
As noted, expectations of privacy are often greatly reduced in em-
ployer-owned devices, particularly when combined with an employer
policy permitting its inspection.196 In certain circumstances, however,
expectations of privacy in employer-issued devices can be reasonable,
especially in the case of exclusive use or possession by the em-
ployee.197 Nevertheless, the lack of an employee’s ownership or pre-
sent possessory interest in a device can help defeat the employee’s
intrusion claim. A recent California case, Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v.
193. Id. at 726 (second alteration in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 342 (1985)); see Larios, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 783–84 (recognizing that such “[a]
customized data withdrawal would have fallen squarely within the workplace in-
spection exception”); see also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (establishing these rea-
sonableness requirements).
194. This statement is based on the author’s research and review of relevant legal
authorities. Cf. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,
No. 15-CV-3526 (KMW) (RLE), 2017 WL 4403310, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017)
(noting that, “[i]n support of their motion, Defendants have cited no decisions
applying O’Connor to personally-owned cell phones or to similar objects,” but that
upon conducting its “own research,” the court found “decisions where O’Connor
was held to justify searches of certain personal objects and places, including
closed backpacks and even an individual’s home as part of ‘sick check’”).
195. See, e.g., Kaczmarek v. Cabela’s Retail Ill., Inc., No. 1-14-3813, 2015 WL 6156352,
at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 16, 2015).
196. See supra section III.A (discussing City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010)).
197. See generally Quon, 560 U.S. at 759–60. See also United States v. Finley, 477
F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that defendant-employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the call records and text messages sent on a cell phone
issued to him by his uncle’s business); State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 407
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (listing factors courts consider in determining whether a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a place or object, including
“whether the defendant had a proprietary or possessory interest in the place or
object searched” and “whether the defendant had a right to exclude others from
the place or object”).
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Victor,198 demonstrates how a company’s former employee may lose
any expectation of privacy he might have had in an employer-issued
cell phone once he no longer has possession of the phone.
Sunbelt Rentals involved a lawsuit filed by an equipment rental
company, Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., against one of its former employees,
Santiago Victor, alleging that he misappropriated the company’s trade
secrets after his termination.199 Victor began working for Sunbelt in
2000 and was promoted to an outside sales representative position in
2007.200 According to Sunbelt’s complaint, Sunbelt had invested sub-
stantial time and money in developing confidential information relat-
ing to its customers, including their renting and purchasing needs,
habits, and histories.201 To protect the confidentiality of its customer
information, Sunbelt required its outside sales representatives to sign
employment agreements containing post-employment non-disclosure
and non-solicitation provisions.202 Victor signed such an agreement
when he was promoted.203
While employed with Sunbelt, “Victor was assigned a Sunbelt-
owned iPhone (‘Sunbelt iPhone’) . . . for both work and personal pur-
poses. Thereafter, Victor ‘created and paid for a personal “Apple ac-
count” that was linked to [his Sunbelt iPhone].’”204 In 2013, Victor left
Sunbelt to work for one of Sunbelt’s competitors, Ahern Rentals
(Ahern).205 At that time, Victor returned his Sunbelt iPhone to Sun-
belt.206 In addition, Victor’s new employer, Ahern, provided him a new
iPhone (Ahern iPhone). Victor then “registered or linked his Ahern
iPhone to the same personal Apple account he had previously used
while at Sunbelt. This process ‘synced’ Victor’s Ahern iPhone with his
personal Apple account.”207 Because Victor had failed to unlink the
Sunbelt iPhone from his Apple account, his electronic data, including
the text messages sent to and from his Ahern iPhone, were also trans-
mitted to the Sunbelt iPhone.208
198. 43 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
199. Id. at 1028.
200. Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at 5–6, Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 43 F.
Supp. 3d 1026 (No. C13-4240).
201. Id. at 4.
202. Id. at 5.
203. Id. at 6–8.
204. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1028 (citations omitted).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1028–29 (citations omitted).
208. Id. at 1029. Several weeks later, when Victor linked a new iPad to his personal
Apple account, Victor discovered the telephone number associated with the Sun-
belt iPhone was still linked to his personal Apple account. Id. He “then deleted
the Sunbelt number from his account ‘to ensure that his new Ahern issued Apple
products were not in any way linked to Sunbelt.’” Id.
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According to Sunbelt’s complaint, once Victor began working for
Ahern, Victor immediately began contacting and soliciting Sunbelt’s
customers and employees, and successfully solicited business for
Ahern from many of those customers, causing Sunbelt financial
harm.209 Apparently, Sunbelt learned of Victor’s misconduct through
his old Sunbelt iPhone, prompting Victor to file counterclaims against
Sunbelt for allegedly accessing and reviewing his “post-employment
private electronic data and electronic communications (including but
not limited to text messages sent and received from Victor’s Ahern . . .
issued iPhone) without authority, permission, or consent.”210
Sunbelt moved to dismiss Victor’s counterclaims.211 Construing
one of Victor’s claims as a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, the court
noted that, under California law, the tort of intrusion first requires
proof that “the defendant . . . intentionally intrude[d] into a place, con-
versation, or matter as to which the plaintiff has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.”212
On this element, the court explained that “Victor had no right to
exclude others from accessing the Sunbelt iPhone—which he did not
own or possess and no longer had any right to access.”213 Moreover,
Victor failed to maintain the privacy of his text messages when he
failed to unlink his Sunbelt iPhone from his Apple account.214 Thus,
Victor’s intrusion claim failed because he could not “legitimately claim
an expectation of privacy in . . . the Sunbelt iPhone.”215
Sunbelt Rentals is an unusual case in that it involved cell phone
content (text messages) sent from one phone, which itself was not
searched by the employer, that was inadvertently transmitted to a dif-
ferent phone, which was searched by a former employer. Despite these
unusual circumstances, there are two fundamental problems with
Victor’s intrusion claim. First, Victor failed to maintain the privacy of
his text messages vis-à-vis his former employer—including those texts
sent using his new employer’s iPhone—because he failed to unlink his
Sunbelt iPhone from his Apple account.216 In this respect, the case is
arguably analogous to the numerous decisions finding no reasonable
209. Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra note 200, at 9–10.
210. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1029 (emphasis omitted).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1033 (quoting Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2009)). As
in other jurisdictions, under California law, “the intrusion must occur in a man-
ner highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Id. (quoting Hernandez, 211 P.3d at
1072).
213. Id. at 1035.
214. Id.
215. Id. Turning to the second element of the tort, regarding whether the alleged in-
trusion was “highly offensive,” the court found that it would not be offensive for
Sunbelt to “have reviewed text messages sent to a cell phone which it owned and
controlled.” See id. at 1035–36.
216. Id. at 1035.
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expectation of privacy in text messages an individual sends to another
person when those texts are retrieved from that other person’s device
(as opposed to the device from which the messages were sent).217 Sec-
ond, Victor could not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of the Sunbelt iPhone, which now inadvertently con-
tained data sent from his new iPhone, because Victor was not the
owner or subscriber of the cell phone and he no longer had any posses-
sory interest in the device when the text messages at issue were trans-
mitted to that device.218 Stated differently, although an employee can
sometimes legitimately expect privacy in the contents of an employer-
issued cell phone, that would usually only occur when the employee is
the exclusive user of the phone, which was no longer true when the
search occurred in Sunbelt Rentals.219
B. Personal Cell Phones
As with public employers, private employers have at times
searched the contents of a personally-owned cell phone. In one recent
case, Kaczmarek v. Cabela’s Retail Illinois, Inc., plaintiff Michelle
Kaczmarek sued her former employer, Cabela’s, for the tort of intru-
sion upon seclusion based on her employer’s review of her personal cell
phone to investigate a rumored sexual relationship she had with a
manager, Tim Slaby.220
217. See State v. Tentoni, 871 N.W.2d 285, 288–89 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that
criminal defendant did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in text
messages sent by him and discovered through warrantless search of recipient’s
phone); cf. State v. Marcum, 319 P.3d 681, 686–87 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014) (find-
ing that a criminal defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the text
messages she sent to her co-defendant that were obtained not from either defen-
dant’s cell phone, but rather, from the business records of the co-defendants’ cell
phone company, which kept a record of the texts in the regular course of
business).
218. See Marcum, 319 P.3d at 683, 686–87 (discussing cases from numerous jurisdic-
tions finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in a phone’s contents where the
person was the exclusive user of the phone but not the phone’s owner or account
holder); Tentoni, 871 N.W.2d at 289 n.5 (stating that although “courts have recog-
nized an expectation of privacy in text messages on a cell phone,” such an expec-
tation “belongs to the owner or user of the phone”); see also State v. Granville, 423
S.W.3d 399, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (listing factors courts commonly use in
deciding whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or
object searched, including “whether the defendant had a proprietary or posses-
sory interest in the place or object searched” and “whether the defendant had a
right to exclude others from the place or object”); Tentoni, 871 N.W.2d at 287–88
(listing similar factors).
219. See Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1035.
220. Kaczmarek v. Cabela’s Retail Ill., Inc., No. 1-14-3813, 2015 WL 6156352, at *1–2
(Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 16, 2015).
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Kaczmarek was employed as a cashier at a Cabela’s store in Illi-
nois from April 2011 until September 2012.221 During that time,
Kaczmarek befriended Slaby, a senior retail operations manager.222
In her deposition, Kaczmarek stated that there was nothing inappro-
priate about her relationship with Slaby, who was considerably older
than her. She explained that she got to know Slaby during breaks at
work, and they would exchange texts regarding topics such as movies,
music, and internet links. According to Kaczmarek, Slaby once invited
her to “ ‘go drinking with him’ via text, but this never happened.”223
Thereafter, Kaczmarek “told her co-worker, Krystle Magsino, about
her texts with Mr. Slaby and showed her some of those texts.”224
On July 14, 2012, Kaczmarek’s supervisor, Tammi Killis, con-
fronted her about rumors that she and Slaby were involved in a sexual
relationship.225 Kaczmarek denied the rumors and further denied
that she had Slaby’s phone number or had exchanged texts with
him.226 The next day, however, Kaczmarek admitted to Killis that she
had texted with Slaby.227 Kaczmarek then showed Killis some of her
recent texts with Slaby “to prove that there was nothing going on” be-
tween them.228
On July 16, 2012,229 Kaczmarek was called to a meeting with Kil-
lis and Frank Mazzocco, the defendant’s human resource manager, to
discuss the rumors. During that meeting, Mazzocco allegedly “told
[Kaczmarek] that she needed to give him her cell phone or she would
be fired.”230 Describing Kaczmarek’s deposition testimony, the court
states that Kaczmarek “admitted that she provided her cell phone for
Mr. Mazzocco to review, albeit only after he indicated that he needed
to determine [the] nature of her relationship with Mr. Slaby and that
she might be fired if she refused.”231
According to Kaczmarek’s complaint,232 after she reluctantly pro-









229. The court initially stated that the meeting with Killis and Mazzocco occurred on
July 15, 2012, id. at *1, but later stated that it occurred on July 16, 2012, id. at
*3. The important point, however, is that the meeting occurred after Kaczmarek
had initially showed Killis some of her recent texts with Slaby. See id. at *2–3.
230. Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Id. at *3.
232. The “Background” section of the court’s opinion appears to summarize the allega-
tions of the plaintiff’s complaint, but at times it is not clear in that regard. Id. at
*1–3.
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features and applications including her text messages and possibly
her photos.”233 Kaczmarek alleged that Mazzocco “took notes (pre-
sumably of the texts) and photos with his own cell phone (presumably
of the texts or photos) and/or transferred data to his cell phone.”234
Later in her deposition, Kaczmarek stated that Mazzocco reviewed
her phone for between five and ten minutes; she observed Mazzocco
taking pictures of her phone but could not tell exactly what content he
had reviewed.235 During the meeting, Kaczmarek was allegedly
“scared, crying and fearful for her employment.”236
After the cell phone search, Kaczmarek was allegedly shunned by
her coworkers237 and formally disciplined for initially lying to Killis
about her communications with Slaby.238 According to Kaczmarek,
these circumstances caused her emotional distress and anxiety,
prompting her to resign.239
After the trial court granted Cabela’s motion for summary judg-
ment on Kaczmarek’s intrusion claim, she appealed that decision to
the Appellate Court of Illinois.240 Applying the Illinois tort of intru-
sion, as derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts,241 the court
declared: “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or con-
cerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”242
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff must prove the following elements of the
tort of intrusion: “(1) the defendant committed an unauthorized intru-
sion or prying into the plaintiff’s seclusion; (2) the intrusion would be
highly offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the matter
intruded on was private; and (4) the intrusion caused the plaintiff
anguish and suffering.”243
233. Id. at *1 (alteration in original).
234. Id.
235. Id. at *3.
236. Id. at *1.
237. Id. at *2.
238. Id. at *3.
239. Id. at *2–3.
240. Id. at *3. The trial court found that: “(1) [Kaczmarek] had no factual basis to
conclude that Mr. Mazzocco reviewed anything other than the texts between [her]
and Mr. Slaby; and (2) ‘[p]laintiff cannot demonstrate that the intrusion is not
only offensive, but highly offensive to a reasonable person.’” Id. (third alteration
in original).
241. See id. at *4 n.2.
242. Id. at *4 (quoting Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004)); see also Lawlor v. N. Am. Corp. of Ill., 983 N.E.2d 414, 425 (Ill. 2012)
(discussing Illinois appellate court cases that have recognized the tort of intru-
sion upon seclusion and opting to “join the vast majority of other jurisdictions
that recognize the tort of intrusion upon seclusion”).
243. Kaczmarek, 2015 WL 6156352, at *4 (quoting Busse, 813 N.E.2d at 1017).
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According to the appellate court, “[t]he third element of the tort [of
intrusion] appears to be the predicate for the other three.”244 Under
this element, “[p]rivate facts must be alleged,” without which “the
other three elements of the tort need not be reached.”245 Under Illi-
nois precedent, “it is not sufficient if the behavior complained of only
intrudes into personal, rather than private, matters.”246 In this con-
text, private matters are those “which are facially embarrassing and
highly offensive if disclosed,”247 such as those relating to “ ‘family
problems, romantic interests, sex lives, health problems, future work
plans and criticism of [an employer].’”248
Turning to the merits, the court first found no genuine dispute re-
garding the scope of the information reviewed by Mazzocco.249 The
court reasoned that:
Mazzocco’s affidavit, filed in support of defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment, [averred] that he only “reviewed and counted up the number of recent
text messages between Tim Slaby and Michelle Kaczmarek that were on
[plaintiff’s] cell phone” and that he “did not review any personal text messages
or any other items in Ms. Kaczmarek’s cell phone.”250
And for her part, Kaczmarek admitted that “she had no way of know-
ing exactly what Mr. Mazzocco reviewed on her phone.”251 Based on
Kaczmarek’s response, the court concluded that Mazzocco’s affidavit
was “not contradicted by counteraffidavit,” making the statements in
Mazzocco’s affidavit admitted for purposes of summary judgment
analysis.252 Accordingly, the court assumed “as true” Mazzocco’s
description of his search.253
Having narrowed the scope of Mazzocco’s search to only the recent
text messages between Kaczmarek and Slaby, the court then rejected
the argument that those texts were private under Illinois law.254 The
court provided several reasons to support this finding. First, the court
“fail[ed] to see how [Kaczmarek’s] recent text messages to Mr. Slaby
[could] be viewed as a private matter at the time they were reviewed
by Mr. Mazzocco, when [Kaczmarek] had already shared them with at
244. Id. at *5 (first alteration in original) (quoting Busse, 813 N.E.2d at 1017).
245. Id. at *5; Busse, 813 N.E.2d at 1017.
246. Kaczmarek, 2015 WL 6156352, at *5 (quoting Vega v. Chi. Park Dist., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2013)).
247. Id. (quoting Cooney v. Chi. Pub. Schs., 943 N.E.2d 23, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)).
248. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Vega, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 959).
249. Id.
250. Id. (second alteration in original).
251. Id.
252. Id. (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Anderson, 963 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2011)).
253. Id. Under these circumstances, the court noted that it would require speculation
or conjecture to assume Mazzocco reviewed any additional information on Kacz-
marek’s cell phone, which is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Id.
254. Id. at *6.
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least two other people” (Masingo and Killis).255 Employing a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy analysis, the court thus declared, “[p]ersons
cannot reasonably maintain an expectation of privacy in that which
they display openly.”256 Second, the court reasoned that Kaczmarek
herself maintained there was nothing inappropriate about her rela-
tionship with Slaby, adding that she showed Killis the texts “to prove
that there was nothing going on.”257 For an intrusion claim, however,
private matters are those “which are facially embarrassing and highly
offensive if disclosed.”258 “By [Kaczmarek’s] own admission,” the court
reasoned, “her texts with Mr. Slaby were just the opposite.”259 Finally,
the court reasoned that “[t]here is nothing facially embarrassing or
highly offensive” about the few texts that were actually included in
the record.260 With this crucial element lacking, the court affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant.261
Although the point of this Article is not to criticize the opinion in
Kaczmarek, a case with some unusual aspects,262 a few points about
the case are warranted. As noted, to prevail on a tort of intrusion
claim under Illinois law, a plaintiff must typically prove “(1) the defen-
dant committed an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plain-
tiff’s seclusion; (2) the intrusion would be highly offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the matter intruded on was
private; and (4) the intrusion caused the plaintiff anguish and
suffering.”263
255. Id.
256. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Acosta v. Scott Labor LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d
647, 650 (N.D. Ill. 2005)).
257. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).




262. This case is unusual in many respects. First, the court notes that immediately
after the investigation regarding Kaczmarek and Slaby was complete, Slaby was
fired. Id. at *3. Yet, it is unclear why he was fired (because the court does not
specify), other than perhaps a conclusion by Mazzocco that Kaczmarek and Slaby
were indeed involved in an inappropriate relationship. Moreover, in response to
Cabela’s motion for summary judgment, Kaczmarek voluntarily dismissed, with
prejudice, two defamation counts in her complaint that alleged she had been de-
famed by the untrue statements made by Killis and others. Id. at *2. These cir-
cumstances may reinforce the notion that there was, in fact, evidence indicating
that Kaczmarek and Slaby were indeed involved in an inappropriate relation-
ship. And if that is true, then it becomes more likely that the cell phone contents
reviewed by Mazzocco were indeed private under Illinois law—at least, there
might have been a genuine issue of material fact on that point. See Busse v. Mo-
torola, Inc., 813 N.E.2d 1013, 1017–18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (noting that “[p]rivate
facts were at issue and clearly alleged in” another Illinois case where investiga-
tors gathered and reported personal information about employees, including
their “romantic interests” and “sex lives”).
263. Busse, 813 N.E.2d at 1017.
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Regarding the first element, there is no doubt that Mazzocco “com-
mitted an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff’s seclu-
sion” when he forced Kaczmarek to reveal the contents of her personal
cell phone after threatening to fire her if she refused.264 In this re-
spect, where coerced consent seems apparent, the similarities to Port
Authority are striking.265 Regarding the fourth element, there also
seems to be no real dispute that Kaczmarek suffered “anguish and suf-
fering” as a result.266 Accordingly, the issues that remain are whether
the contents of Kaczmarek’s cell phone were private, and, if so,
whether Mazzocco’s review of those contents was highly offensive, an
issue not reached by the court.267
The court’s conclusion that the contents of Kaczmarek’s cell phone
were not private, including that she could not reasonably expect pri-
vacy in those particular contents,268 is questionable. First, the true
issue in this case is not, as the court put it, whether Kaczmarek’s re-
cent text messages with Slaby “can be viewed as a private matter at
the time they were reviewed by Mr. Mazzocco,”269 implying that a full
history of text messages between two individuals became entirely un-
protected after a few of those messages were shown to another individ-
ual. Rather, the question is whether Kaczmarek could reasonably
expect privacy vis-à-vis a seemingly unrestrained search of her phone
by her employer’s human resource manager during a formal investiga-
tion into a matter he apparently viewed as very serious.
As noted by the court, when Kaczmarek elected to show Killis a few
of her recent text messages with Slaby the day before Mazzocco’s
search, she did so voluntarily “to prove that there was nothing going
on in hopes that [Killis] saw it was just friendly conversations.”270 In
effect, the court ruled that Kaczmarek’s initial, limited consent some-
264. Kaczmarek, 2015 WL 6156352, at *3 (describing plaintiff’s seemingly undisputed
deposition testimony in this regard).
265. See supra notes 151–166 and accompanying text.
266. See Kaczmarek, 2015 WL 6156352, at *1. In her complaint, Kaczmarek states
that she was allegedly “very upset at these accusations [about her alleged rela-
tionship with Slaby] and specifically and vehemently denied any sexual relation-
ship.” Id. Further, the court notes that during her meeting with Mazzocco,
Kaczmarek “was allegedly ‘scared, crying and fearful for her employment.’” Id. at
*2. Thereafter, Kaczmarek was allegedly shunned by her coworkers, and Kacz-
marek contended that these circumstances caused her emotional distress and
anxiety, evidenced by the fact that she then sought professional help resulting in
a leave of absence from her employment. Id. In the author’s view, this is enough
to at least establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the tort’s second
element.
267. Id. at *6.
268. Id. (applying the principle that “[p]ersons cannot reasonably maintain an expec-
tation of privacy in that which they display openly” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Acosta v. Scott Labor LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 647, 650 (N.D. Ill. 2005))).
269. Id. (emphasis added).
270. Id. at *2.
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how also extended to a more extensive search of potentially all of her
cell phone’s contents at a later date by a different person. This reason-
ing is like finding that a criminal suspect’s consent to one police of-
ficer’s search of his bedroom on Monday also authorizes a search of his
entire house by a different officer on Tuesday, a finding that would
violate Fourth Amendment consent principles.271 Under Fourth
Amendment precedents, after all, there is a difference between a
search based on valid consent that is limited in scope, and a subse-
quent search based on coerced consent that is not so limited.272
Second, the identity of the individual conducting each search mat-
ters, as expectations of privacy may vary as between different search-
ing parties. The Supreme Court has noted, for example, that an
employee may have different expectations of privacy regarding a
search by an employer versus a search by other government offi-
cials.273 Accordingly, it is possible that Kaczmarek could have relin-
quished any expectation of privacy she had vis-à-vis her direct
supervisor, while failing to do so vis-à-vis a human resources investi-
gator in the context of a more formal investigation of employee
misconduct.274
Third, the court’s conclusion regarding the scope of Mazzocco’s re-
view is problematic. As the court notes, Kaczmarek had no way of
knowing exactly what contents of her phone Mazzocco reviewed. Kacz-
marek’s lack of knowledge on this issue, however, should not preclude
her from withstanding summary judgment. In this respect, the case is
similar to other intrusion claims in which, given the secretive nature
of the apparent intrusion, the plaintiff is unable to prove the exact
dimensions of the intrusion but can still survive summary judgment
based on its inherently invasive nature. In Koeppel v. Speirs,275 for
example, where an employer installed a hidden video camera in the
bathroom used by his female employees, the Iowa Supreme Court
ruled that an actual intrusion on the employees’ privacy could be in-
271. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 62, at 256 (“If A consents to a ten-minute
search, the police may not invoke consent to justify the search after the consent
expires.”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 61, at 218 (“As a general rule, it would seem
that a consent to search may be said to have been given on the understanding
that the search will be conducted forthwith and that only a single search will be
made.”).
272. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“The scope of a search is gener-
ally defined by its expressed object.”).
273. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968).
274. See 2 L. CAMILLE HÉBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 8A:51 (2020) (discussing
Kaczmarek and finding “[t]he court’s analysis . . . subject to challenge”; reasoning
“that one voluntarily shares private information with some individuals should
not compel one to share that information with an employer conducting an investi-
gation upon pain of termination; an employee should have the choice to selec-
tively share private information with some and not others”).
275. 808 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 2011).
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ferred from the mere discovery of a functional camera in the bath-
room, despite no evidence that the defendant actually used the camera
to spy on the plaintiffs.276 So too could a reasonable jury infer that
Mazzocco’s extensive review of Kaczmarek’s phone intruded upon her
private matters. This is especially true in light of Kaczmarek’s testi-
mony that Mazzocco reviewed her phone for up to ten minutes and
that she observed Mazzocco taking pictures of her phone. As another
commentator has noted: “The mere fact of being compelled to share
private and personal information with an employer upon pain of ter-
mination should be viewed as highly offensive without some compel-
ling justification for that compulsion.”277 This is particularly true for
private communications made on a personal cell phone.278 As estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Riley, the “privacy-related concerns”
in cell phones are so substantial that searching those devices without
a warrant is generally unlawful under the Fourth Amendment—even
for persons whose expectations of privacy are generally reduced—de-
spite the searching party’s assurances regarding the limited nature of
the invasion.279
V. PROPOSALS
Having examined the law governing private and public employers,
particularly as it pertains to cell phone searches, this Part provides
guidelines and proposals for cell phone searches by employers.
A. Overall Framework of Analysis
In light of the search and seizure principles outlined in this Article,
when a court reviews an employer’s search or seizure of the contents
of an employee’s cell phone, the court should engage in the simple,
three-step analysis outlined below.
In the first step, the court should determine whether the searching
party acted in its capacity as an employer.280 If so, the court should
identify whether the employer is a public or private employer, as this
distinction will alter the applicable legal framework and potentially
276. Koeppel v. Speirs, 779 N.W.2d 494 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 808 N.W.2d 177
(Iowa 2011); see also Koeppel, 808 N.W.2d at 182–83 (discussing similar cases
that focus on the “potential for viewing” created by the defendant’s actions).
277. L. CAMILLE HÉBERT, supra note 274.
278. See id.
279. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (holding that police must gener-
ally secure a warrant before searching data within a cell phone found on an arres-
tee); id. at 393 (rejecting the government’s argument that searching the contents
of a cell phone found on an arrestee is analogous to searching personal items
carried by an arrestee, such as billfolds or address books).
280. If an employer is acting as an agent of law enforcement as part of a criminal
investigation, different Fourth Amendment principles would apply. See Larios v.
Lunardi, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1299 (E.D. Cal. 2020).
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impact the lawfulness of the employer’s action in close cases (given the
differing inquiries of reasonableness and extreme offensiveness).281
In the second step, the court should apply the factors discussed in
section V.B of this Part to determine whether the employee can rea-
sonably expect privacy in the particular cell phone contents at issue. If
the court determines that the employee cannot reasonably expect pri-
vacy in those contents, the employer’s review should be deemed law-
ful, ending the court’s inquiry.
Finally, if the court determines that the employee can reasonably
expect privacy in the cell phone contents at issue, the court should
determine whether the employer’s search or seizure of those contents
is either (a) unreasonable for a public employer’s actions, or (b) highly
offensive for a private employer’s actions. Of particular relevance
under this final step for either type of employer is whether the em-
ployer limits the scope of its review to avoid accessing private informa-
tion untethered to the intrusion’s justifications.
The remainder of this Part provides additional details and propos-
als for steps two and three above.
B. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
Under either the Fourth Amendment or the tort of intrusion, if an
employee cannot reasonably expect privacy in the contents of the cell
phone, the employee cannot prove an unlawful invasion of privacy.282
Accordingly, the critical threshold issue for any employer-initiated cell
phone search is whether the employee can legitimately expect privacy
in the cell phone’s contents.
Although this is a totality of circumstances inquiry that examines
any relevant factor in the case at hand, the most critical factors that
may impact an employee’s expectation of privacy in a cell phone in-
clude (a) whether the device at issue is owned by the employer or em-
ployee; (b) whether the employee is the exclusive user or possessor of
the device; (c) whether an employer policy permits a search of the de-
vice or a seizure of its contents; (d) whether the employee voluntarily
consented either to the employer’s policy or to the particular search at
issue; and (e) whether the employer reviews the contents of a commu-
nication stored within the device, or instead limits its search to deter-
mining whether a communication occurred. Each of these factors are
discussed below. In addition, because device ownership may dramati-
cally alter expectations of privacy, this section addresses employer-
owned and personally-owned cell phones separately and presents spe-
cific proposals for each type of device.
281. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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1. Employer-Issued Cell Phones
As discussed, device ownership is important under the Fourth
Amendment because, generally speaking, employees enjoy greater ex-
pectations of privacy in personally-owned devices as compared to em-
ployer-owned devices.283 Nevertheless, device ownership is merely
one factor courts may consider in determining whether an asserted
expectation of privacy is reasonable, and the commingling of personal
and work-related information that can occur in either type of device
can muddy the waters in this area.284 Thus, ownership alone does not
determine whether an employee can reasonably expect privacy in a
cell phone’s contents.
Even for employer-owned devices, where expectations of privacy
are generally reduced, courts have recognized that when an employee
is the exclusive user of a device, it might be reasonable for the em-
ployee to expect privacy in that device.285 In United States v. Finley,
for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
struck down a police officer’s warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell
phone discovered in his pocket upon arrest.286 The phone belonged to
Southwest Plumbing and had been issued to the arrestee, Jacob Fin-
ley, for work, but Finley was permitted to use the phone for personal
purposes as well.287 Although the court recognized that “Finley’s in-
terest was possessory only,”288 the court declared that Finley’s lack of
an ownership interest in the phone was not dispositive.289 The court
concluded that even though “Finley’s employer could have read the
text messages once he returned the phone,” as in a case like Sunbelt
Rentals, this “does not imply that a person in Finley’s position should
not have reasonably expected to be free from intrusion from both the
government and the general public” at a time when the phone re-
mained in the employee’s possession.290 In these circumstances,
where “Finley had a right to exclude others from using the phone,” the
court concluded that Finley had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the call records and text messages on the cell phone, and therefore,
had standing to challenge the search of that device by law
enforcement.291
283. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 218; United States v. Ibarra, 948 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1991)
(listing similar factors as those in Granville and Tentoni).
286. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 2007).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 259 n.5.
289. Id. at 259.
290. Id.
291. Id. The court went on to find, however, that this search was reasonable under the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, id. at 259–60, a
ruling that is now called into doubt by Riley.
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In Finley, the employee’s cell phone was searched by a police of-
ficer, rather than Finley’s employer. The identity of the searching
party is important because an employee’s expectations of privacy may
differ as between different state actors.292 For searches by employers,
expectations of privacy might be altered by the existence of an em-
ployer policy giving the employer the right to inspect an employer-
owned device for certain business-related reasons or more broadly
stating that the employee cannot reasonably expect privacy in the de-
vice’s contents.293 Accordingly, if an employer’s policy, to which an
employee has voluntarily consented, clearly states that an employer-
issued cell phone may be searched by the employer or that the em-
ployee cannot reasonably expect privacy in the cell phone’s contents,
that policy might override any expectation of privacy the employee
otherwise enjoys in regards to his or her employer.294
Finally, when a person’s communications are at issue, such as an
employee’s text messages, Fourth Amendment law often distinguishes
between the content of communications and the addressing informa-
tion associated with those communications.295 And although this dis-
tinction arose in the criminal investigation context, courts have
applied this distinction to employer-initiated searches.296 This distinc-
292. See, e.g., United States v. Yudong Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(finding an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his employer-
owned laptop vis-à-vis a search by law enforcement, rather than a search by the
employer itself).
293. See, e.g., id. at 236–37 (discussing two policies of employer NYU: one which ap-
plied to faculty acknowledging “that [NYU] may inspect the computers it owns,
as well as personal PCs used for work, to ensure that its data and software are
used according to its policies and procedures”; and another applying to staff and
stating that “[c]omputers, e-mail systems, and electronic communications and
equipment are the sole property of NYU . . . and staff should not have any expec-
tation of privacy” (second alteration in original)); see also id. at 239–40 (finding
Yudong Zhu, a faculty member, was not bound by the broader policy pertaining to
staff).
294. See id. at 239–40; see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010)
(“[E]mployer policies concerning communications will of course shape the reason-
able expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies
are clearly communicated.”).
295. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979) (discussing the distinction
between the content of communications and the addressing information associ-
ated with those communications).
296. Under both the Fourth Amendment and the tort of intrusion, courts have recog-
nized that it is generally more invasive to access the contents of text messages, as
opposed to accessing a list of numbers and names with which a person has com-
municated. See, e.g., McGreal v. AT&T Corp., 892 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1015 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (tort of intrusion); Cunningham v. Terrebonne Par. Consol. Gov’t, No. 09-
8046, 2011 WL 651997, at *2, *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 11, 2011) (rejecting summary
judgment for employee on his Fourth Amendment claim due to genuine issues of
fact as to whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
cell phone records containing only numbers dialed and received, but not names or
substance); cf. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Victor, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1035 (N.D.
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tion helps explain why the human resources manager who searched
the employee’s phone in Kaczmarek was careful to state that he
merely “counted up the number of [relevant] text messages” on the
plaintiff’s cell phone and “did not review any personal text messages
or any other items in [the] cell phone.”297 In essence, the more content
an employer reviews—particularly content unrelated to the legitimate
objectives of the search—the more likely a court will conclude that the
employer has infringed the employee’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.
From an employer’s perspective, then, when a public or private em-
ployer wishes to search an employer-issued cell phone or seize its con-
tents, the employer should carefully consider the factors identified
above, along with any other relevant factors in the case, to determine
whether the employee can reasonably expect privacy in the contents
the employer wishes to review. Key factors that might reduce expecta-
tions of privacy, even for devices used exclusively by one employee,
include clearly written and communicated policies authorizing
searches and seizures of those devices, and employer actions that are
narrow in scope and generally avoid the content of employee commu-
nications. In the end, there can be no one-size-fits-all determination
regarding whether an employee can reasonably expect privacy in an
employer-owned cell phone, as the variables identified above can lead
to different outcomes in different cases.
2. Personal Cell Phones
Turning to searches of personal cell phones, in light of Riley, there
can be no doubt that employees can generally expect privacy in the
contents of their personal cell phones.298 Although Riley involved a
cell phone found on an arrestee,299 a distinct context, Riley elevated
personal cell phones to a unique Fourth Amendment position.300 Riley
indicated, for example, that personal cell phones may deserve even
greater constitutional protection than what is owed to the home.301
Cal. 2014) (“This and other courts have concluded that there is no ‘legally pro-
tected privacy interest and reasonable expectation of privacy’ in electronic
messages, ‘in general.’ Rather, a privacy interest can exist, if at all, only with
respect to the content of those communications.” (citations omitted)); In re Yahoo
Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1040–41 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (discussing the impor-
tance of identifying particular content in intercepted e-mail).
297. Kaczmarek v. Cabela’s Retail Ill., Inc., No. 1-14-3813, 2015 WL 6156352, at *3
(Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 16, 2015).
298. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–97 (2014) (discussing the privacy interests
at stake in cell phone searches).
299. See id. at 386 (holding that police must generally secure a warrant before search-
ing the contents of personal cell phones).
300. See supra notes 114–30 and accompanying text (discussing Riley).
301. On that note, Riley stated that, “[a] phone not only contains in digital form many
sensitive records previously found in the home,” such as bank statements, “it also
2021] CELL PHONE SEARCHES BY EMPLOYERS 981
Riley also noted that the storage capacity of modern smart phones is
massive and, by analogy to physical searches, is like housing a vast
warehouse of information.302
Given the unique privacy concerns of the modern cell phone, this
Article proposes a rebuttable presumption that employees of both pub-
lic and private employers can reasonably expect privacy in the con-
tents of a personal cell phone. Under this Article’s proposal, this
presumption could be defeated if an employer has implemented a clear
and narrowly-defined policy permitting the employer to search or
seize specified contents of a personally-owned device used for work-
related purposes, as in a case like Larios.303 As in Larios, however,
this proposed exception would apply only if employees have volunta-
rily consented to the employer’s policy, and only if the policy is justi-
fied by a legitimate business need to manage or review particular
employment-related data contained within the phone.304
C. Overall Lawfulness of Cell Phone Searches and Seizures
In cases where an employee can reasonably expect privacy in the
particular contents of his or her cell phone, the question becomes
whether an employer’s search or seizure of those contents is either
unreasonable or highly offensive, depending on the type of employer.
This section examines this ultimate inquiry for both public and pri-
vate employers.
1. Public Employer Searches and Seizures
a. Employer-Issued Cell Phones
As discussed in the previous section, employees often have limited
expectations of privacy in employer-owned cell phones, particularly
where an employer’s policy permits their inspection, making them
more freely searchable by employers. Nevertheless, there will be times
when a public employee can reasonably expect privacy in an employer-
issued cell phone. In those cases, this Article argues, consistent with
contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form,”
such as an Internet search and browsing history or a collection of apps that re-
veal a person’s hobbies and interests. Riley, 573 U.S. at 396–97.
302. See id. at 397.
303. See supra subsection III.B.2.
304. See supra subsection III.B.2. To be clear, both the Larios court and the Supreme
Court in Quon assumed arguendo that a search occurred but ruled that the
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Larios v. Lunardi, 442
F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1310 (E.D. Cal. 2020); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746,
760 (2010). Under Fourth Amendment precedents, however, notice and consent
by an employee can impact both an employee’s expectations of privacy as well as
the ultimate reasonableness of a search. See Marc Chase McAllister, GPS and
Cell Phone Tracking of Employees, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1265, 1305–10 (2018) (discuss-
ing the role of notice and consent in an employer-initiated GPS tracking case).
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O’Connor and Quon, that such searches must be both reasonable at
the inception and reasonable in scope.305
Of particular relevance under the O’Connor framework, this Arti-
cle emphasizes the need for employers to properly limit the scope of
their search to avoid accessing private information untethered from
the specific work-related purpose for the search.306 In Quon, for exam-
ple, the Court emphasized the limited scope of the employer’s review.
Although Quon had exceeded his monthly character limit several
times, the City reviewed only two months of transcripts and redacted
all messages Quon sent while off duty, which were more likely to be
personal in nature.307 Likewise, in Larios, although the case involved
a personally-owned cell phone, the court distinguished between
downloading the phone’s entire contents, which was deemed an unrea-
sonable seizure, and the relatively limited search of only the particu-
lar text messages that were relevant to the employee’s act of
misconduct, which was deemed reasonable.308 In sum, when a public
employer searches an employer-issued device to investigate employee
misconduct (as in Larios) or for a noninvestigatory, work-related pur-
pose (as in Quon), the employer should review no more content than
necessary to accomplish the employer’s objective. As a general rule,
the less content that is reviewed, the more likely the search will be
considered reasonable.
b. Personal Cell Phones
As previously discussed, there can be no doubt that employees can
reasonably expect privacy in the contents of their personal cell phones,
particularly in light of Riley.309 Accordingly, the question becomes
what makes a search of those devices lawful.
For searches by public employers, this Article argues that person-
ally-owned cell phones are generally beyond the reach of the O’Connor
workplace exception and should not be searched due to their unique
capacity to hold immense amounts of private information. As articu-
lated by Riley, modern cell phones generate privacy concerns that ex-
ceed even those found in the home, the area that has enjoyed the most
305. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987).
306. See id. at 726 (explaining that two types of employer-initiated searches might fall
within the scope of the O’Connor exception: (1) those made for a noninvestigatory,
work-related purpose, such as entering an office to retrieve a needed file; and (2)
those made as part of an investigation of work-related misconduct).
307. Quon, 560 U.S. at 761–62.
308. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. Regarding the search, the court
emphasized that the defendants restricted their search of Larios’s phone to re-
viewing only his texts with confidential informant Mellow, and even further to a
subset of those messages from the time period during which Larios and Mellow
might have communicated through the device. Larios, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1310.
309. See supra notes 114–30 and accompanying text (discussing Riley).
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Fourth Amendment protection.310 And just as courts have held that
searches of an employee’s home fall outside the “workplace context,”
so too should searches of personal cell phones.311
To be sure, Riley involved a warrantless search of a personally-
owned cell phone conducted on the heels of an arrest, which is distinct
from the employment setting. Nevertheless, the potential privacy con-
cerns do not change simply because the phone is used by an employee,
rather than an arrestee.312 In addition, arrestees and employees are
on similar Fourth Amendment ground, as both groups have reduced
expectations of privacy as a class.313 Yet, despite acknowledging that
arrestees have “diminished privacy interests,” Riley found that the
“privacy-related concerns” in cell phones’ digital data are so substan-
tial that searching such data requires a warrant.314 Employees per-
sonally-owned cell phones are entitled to at least the same protection.
Quite simply, if “privacy-related concerns are weighty enough”315 to
require a warrant to search personal cell phones of arrestees, who on
the whole have reduced Fourth Amendment protection, then those
same privacy-related concerns are likewise weighty enough for em-
ployees, who also have reduced Fourth Amendment protection.316
Beyond Riley, for the O’Connor workplace exception to apply, the
device at issue, or at least the particular contents of the device at is-
310. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014) (declaring that “a cell phone
search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaus-
tive search of a house” because a phone contains “many sensitive records previ-
ously found in the home” as well as “a broad array of private information never
found in a home in any form”); id. at 401 (“Our holding, of course, is not that the
information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is
generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident
to arrest.”); see also Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. &
N.J., No. 15-CV-3526 (KMW) (RLE), 2017 WL 4403310, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2017) (refusing to apply the workplace exception outlined in O’Connor and noting
that “the privacy interest in a person’s cell phone is similar to, if not greater than,
the privacy interest in one’s home”).
311. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 2017 WL 4403310, at *5.
312. First, the underlying digital data is generally the same. In addition, across the
run of cases, the volume of private information on an employee’s cell phone is
likely similar enough to that found on the typical arrestee’s phone to warrant the
same Fourth Amendment protection. For these reasons, searches of employee cell
phones demand the same Fourth Amendment protection.
313. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
314. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 392–93.
315. Id. at 392.
316. See also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013) (recognizing that in some
searches, such as invasive surgery or a search of an arrestee’s home, for which
“the Court must ‘balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related con-
cerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable,’ the privacy-related concerns
are weighty enough that the search may require a warrant, notwithstanding the
diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee” (quoting Illinois v. McArthur,
531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001))).
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sue, must be “related to work . . . and generally within the employer’s
control.”317 For most employees who bring their personal cell phone to
work, that device would not typically meet this standard (similar to
the closed “handbag, or a briefcase that happens to be within the em-
ployer’s business address” described in O’Connor).318 Simply put, in
most cases, a personal cell phone brought to work is not an “item[ ] . . .
related to work and . . . within the employer’s control.”319 Accordingly,
as Port Authority determined, the O’Connor workplace exception
should not apply, leaving employee consent as the primary justifica-
tion for such a search.320
On the issue of consent, as in Larios, searches of personally-owned
cell phones by public employers might be permissible if an employer
has implemented a clear and narrowly-defined policy authorizing such
searches.321 This proposed exception would apply, however, only if
employees have voluntarily consented to the employer’s policy. Moreo-
ver, as an aspect of reasonableness, this proposed exception would ap-
ply only if the employer’s policy is justified by a legitimate business
need to manage or review particular employment-related data con-
tained within the phone, a requirement that is necessary to protect
the generally private contents of most personal cell phones. In combi-
nation, these requirements would help ensure that the device at issue
is sufficiently “related to work and . . . within the employer’s control”
to be subject to a warrantless search under O’Connor.322
2. Private Employer Searches and Seizures
Under the Fourth Amendment, what is reasonable depends on the
context within which a search takes place.323 Moreover, when the Su-
preme Court applies “traditional standards of reasonableness,” includ-
ing in the employment context, the Court typically weighs “ ‘the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests’ against ‘the degree to
which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.’”324
317. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).
318. Id. at 716.
319. Id. at 715.
320. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 15-CV-3526
(KMW) (RLE), 2017 WL 4403310, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017).
321. See supra subsection III.B.2 (discussing Larios).
322. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715.
323. Id. at 719 (“[T]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted
by [public employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing
such searches . . . . [W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a
search takes place.” (alterations in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 337 (1985))).
324. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Wyo-
ming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
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Under the tort of intrusion, a similar balancing of interests has
been used when determining the overall offensiveness of an em-
ployer’s search or seizure—one that balances the employer’s legiti-
mate business interests in intruding against the nature, manner, and
scope of the intrusion.325 On the employer’s side, the typical private
employer’s interest in searching cell phones is usually no different
than that for public employers, which the O’Connor Court described as
“the efficient and proper operation of the workplace.”326 For example,
in Larios, a Fourth Amendment case, the employer’s interest in
searching the personal cell phone of its employee was to determine
“the scope of [Larios]’s communication with [confidential informant]
Mellow and mitigate harm [to the employer] that might flow from his
potential misconduct.”327 Similarly, in Kaczmarek, a tort of intrusion
case, the employer searched the personal cell phone of one of its
young, female employees to determine whether she was involved in an
inappropriate relationship with an older manager, presumably to mit-
igate any disruption to the work environment.328 In both cases, the
employer’s overriding interest was the same: to ensure the workplace
was operating properly and efficiently.
On the employee’s side, the nature, manner, and scope of intrusion
can all impact the overall offensiveness of an employer’s privacy inva-
sion.329 As used here, “nature” refers to the employee’s privacy inter-
est on which the employer intruded, such as an intrusion upon the
employee’s person, as opposed to her bag or briefcase.330 “Manner” re-
fers to the means the employer used in effecting the intrusion, which
takes into account the possibility of employing less intrusive
means.331 “Scope” refers to the extensiveness or breadth of the intru-
sion when considered in light of the employer’s underlying purpose for
the action.332 As discussed in this Article, these variables—nature,333
325. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); see also id. cmt. a
(noting that “[a]n intrusion upon an employee’s protected privacy interest is ac-
tionable only when that intrusion is highly offensive to a reasonable person under
the circumstances,” and stating that “[t]he purpose of the highly offensive inquiry
is to balance the degree of the intrusion against its private and social
justifications”).
326. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723.
327. Larios v. Lunardi, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1310 (E.D. Cal. 2020).
328. Kaczmarek v. Cabela’s Retail Ill., Inc., No. 1-14-3813, 2015 WL 6156352, at *1–2
(Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 16, 2015).
329. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06.
330. See id. § 7.02 (discussing various employee privacy interests).
331. This variable would consider, for example, an employer’s use of a powerful tele-
photo lens to take pictures of an employee as she moves about inside her home, as
opposed to simply observing those same activities in public. See id. § 7.06 cmt. e,
illus. 8.
332. See id. § 7.06 cmt. f (recognizing, under the tort of intrusion, that the scope of an
intrusion is relevant to determining whether it is wrongful, and that “[i]f the
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manner,334 and scope335—are also relevant under the Fourth Amend-
ment in determining the overall reasonableness of a public employer’s
actions. Accordingly, the proposed framework of analysis is similar for
both public and private employers.
Under this framework, when a private employer searches or seizes
the contents of an employee’s cell phone, it is critical to identify the
precise reason for the employer’s intrusion and weigh that against the
nature, manner, and scope of the intrusion itself to determine its over-
all offensiveness.336 When a private employer has a strong business
justification for searching an employee’s cell phone (as in a case like
Sunbelt Rentals involving a former employee’s likely violation of his
non-disclosure and non-solicitation agreement) this makes the search
less offensive.337 If, however, the employer’s justification for the
search is relatively weak, the search becomes more offensive, espe-
cially if the cell phone is personally owned.
On the other side of the scale, the nature, manner, and scope of
intrusion must be considered. Regarding the nature of intrusion,
searches of personally-owned cell phones are potentially far more in-
vasive of privacy than searches of employer-owned devices, given that
personally-owned cell phones would typically contain more purely pri-
scope extends beyond the purpose of the intrusion in furthering the employer’s
legitimate business interest, the intrusion is unjustified”).
333. As for the nature of the intrusion, this Article summarizes Fourth Amendment
cases involving searches by public employers of both employer-issued and person-
ally-owned devices under circumstances giving rise to differing expectations of
privacy. Compare Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,
No. 15-CV-3526 (KMW) (RLE), 2017 WL 4403310, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2017) (involving an employer’s search of personal cell phones that were not suffi-
ciently related to work to fall within the scope of the workplace exception), with
Larios v. Lunardi, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1319 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (involving an em-
ployer’s search of a personal cell phone that contained the employer’s work prod-
uct). See also RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 7.06 cmt. e (stating that “[t]he nature
of the intrusion is related to the employee’s reasonable privacy expectations in
not revealing the information,” which “in turn depends on how personal the infor-
mation is, . . . and what degree of privacy the employer generally gives employee
activities in the physical or electronic work location in question”).
334. In Larios, for example, the court distinguished between downloading a phone’s
entire contents and a potentially more targeted acquisition of a string of text
messages. See Larios v. Lunardi, 445 F. Supp. 3d 778, 784 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (find-
ing unreasonable the employer’s seizure of all data stored on Larios’s cell phone
to retrieve a single thread of texts, which the court described as “like watering a
plant with a firehose,” where “[t]he means far exceeds the need”); see also id.
(stating that “[a] customized data withdrawal” of only the work-related text
messages in Larios’s cell phone “would have fallen squarely within the workplace
inspection exception”).
335. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (discussing the limited scope of
the search in Quon).
336. See supra note 17.
337. See supra section IV.A (discussing Sunbelt Rentals, Inc.).
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vate content. Regarding manner of search, and as Larios demon-
strates, when an employer is faced with alternative methods for
uncovering certain cell phone data, the employer should select the
least intrusive means available to reduce the overall offensiveness of
the employer’s actions.338 Regarding scope of search, the more content
the employer reviews—particularly content unrelated to the objec-
tives of the search—the more likely the intrusion will be deemed
highly offensive.
With this balancing of interests in mind, this Article argues that
nearly any search of a personally-owned cell phone would be highly
offensive under the tort of intrusion, with the exception of only the
most narrowly-drawn searches authorized by some form of employee
consent. Accordingly, this Article proposes that searches of personally-
owned cell phones should be deemed permissible under the tort of in-
trusion only when employees have voluntarily consented to an em-
ployer’s clear and narrowly-defined policy authorizing such searches,
and only if the employer’s policy is justified by a legitimate business
need to manage or review particular employment-related data within
the phone.
Finally, when a private employer wishes to search an employer-
issued cell phone, where the nature of the intrusion is inherently less
invasive, the employer should ensure it has a strong business-related
justification for the search. As for the search itself, the employer
should carefully limit the scope of its search to avoid accessing private
information unrelated to the intrusion’s justifications and should se-
lect the least intrusive means available for conducting the search. In
essence, the employer’s search should be tied to a legitimate business
objective and should uncover the least amount of cell phone data nec-
essary to accomplish that objective.
VI. CONCLUSION
As cases like Riley and Port Authority make clear, cell phones oc-
cupy a unique position in American privacy laws. As this Article has
shown, when an employer wishes to search or seize the contents of an
employee’s cell phone, the employer should consider whether the em-
ployee can reasonably expect privacy in those contents and should
carefully evaluate the overall reasonableness or offensiveness of its in-
trusion. In the end, a case-specific analysis must be conducted when
determining whether an employer may lawfully search or seize the
contents of an employee’s cell phone. However, the principles identi-
fied in this Article will serve as helpful guides for employers and re-
viewing courts in specific cases.
338. See supra note 189.
